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I. Introduction 
The European Court of Justice's role in inter-
preting the Treaties which created the European 
Community has allowed it to clarify the division of 
powers between the Community and the Member States. 
Through its decision-making it has expanded the 
treaty-making authority of the EC far beyond the 
situations provided for by express grant of powers. 
This paper will explore the Court's development of the 
Community's treaty-making power through reliance on the 
doctrine of implied powers. The greater part of the 
study consists of an analysis of six cases in which the 
Court dealt with the power of the Community to negotiate 
and conclude international agreements. The sections 
which follow include observations on those six cases, a 
discussion of implied powers in United States law, and a 
conclusion in which decisions of the European Court of 
Justice, the United States Supreme Court, and the 
International and Permanent International Courts of 
Justice are compared. My aim has been to illuminate the 
actual standards applied by the European Court of 
Justice, with additional references to the affect of the 
Court's institutional structure on its decision-making 
and the differences between the Community and United 
States conceptions of implied power. 
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II. The European Court of Justice 
1. The ERTA Case: 
a. Facts 
Commission v. Council, Case 22/70 
The ERTA case grew out of an attempt by the 
Member States to conclude the European Road 
Transport Agreement, for which negotiations began in 
1962. At the Council meeting of March 20, 1970 the 
attitude to be taken by the Member States in the 
negotiations was discussed. The Commission 
subsequently lodged an application for annulment of 
the Council deliberations with the Court, arguing 
that the power to conclude the Agreement rested with 
the Community, not the Member States. The Council 
stressed that the application was inadmissible since 
the March 20th discussions did not constitute an 
"act" open to review under Art 173· In dealing with 
this question the Court found it necessary to 
determine whether the power to conclude the 
agreement lay with the Community or the Member 
States. It concluded that the power was the 
Community's, but found that in this case the Member 
States would have to be allowed to act since 
negotiations over the Agreement had begun prior to 
the adoption of Council Regulation No. 543/69 which 
dealt with the subject-matter internally. 
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b. Advocate-General's Opinion 
The opinion of Advocate-General Dutheillet de 
Lamothe contained a powerful warning to the Court 
regarding the EC's treaty-making authority. He 
asserted that should the Court recognize the 
Community's authority to negotiate and conclude the 
European Road Transport Agreement, it would conclude 
that EC authorities exercised not only expressly 
conferred powers, but also "those implied powers 
whereby the Supreme Court of the United States 
supplements the powers of the federal bodies in 
relation to those of the confederated States". The 
Advocate-General noted that a recognition of implied 
powers with regard to negotiations with third 
countries would far exceed the intentions of the 
framers and state signatories of the Treaty. He 
proposed to the Court a "relatively strict" 
interpretation in this sphere. According to 
Dutheillet de Lamothe, Community powers should be 
viewed as "conferred powers" (in French, competences 
d'attribution), which may be widely construed only 
when they are "the direct and necessary extension of 
powers relating to intra-Community ~uestions". The 
Advocate-General also argued that the EC's 
treaty-making powers should not be widely construed, 
F 
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since Article 235 existed in order to vest in the 
Community whatever powers it might need, making such 
a construction unnecessary. To summarize the content 
of the Advocate-General's argument, he concluded that 
implied powers are never acceptable in Community law, 
that wide interpretation is available only in 
relation to internal rather than external questions, 
and that the latter sort of extension can take place 
only when "direct and necessary". 
c. Decision 
Although the Court does not mention the term 
"implied powers" in the ERTA judgment its attitude 
towards the idea that such powers exist as a basis 
for concluding agreements with third states appears 
in the beginning of its decision. Without 
responding to the Council's argument that an express 
provision is necessary for a finding that EC powers 
exist, the Court concludes that "in the absence of 
specific provisions • . one must turn to the 
general system of Community law". The Court 
proceeds by introducing two terms, first "capacity" 
and then "competence". Without defining these terms 
it concludes that Article 210, which states that the 
Community shall have "legal personality", " means 
that in its external relations the Community enjoys 
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the capacity to establish contractual links with 
third countries over the whole field of objectives 
defined in Part One of the Treaty". In regard to 
competence, the Court finds that the EC's authority 
to enter into international agreements, in any 
particular case, must be determined with regard to 
"the whole scheme of the Treaty no less than to its 
substantive provisions". It concludes that "Such 
authority arises not only from an express conferment 
by the Treaty • • but may e~ually flow from other 
provisions of the Treaty and from measures adopted, 
within the framework of those provisions by the 
Community institutions". 
d. Analysis 
i. Advocate-General's Opinion 
The Advocate-General's argument that Article 
235 negated all necessity of relying on wide inter-
pretation in the ERTA case could, in reality, be 
applied to all uses of wide interpretation to 
supplement Community powers and to all findings of 
implied powers as well, if there is actually a real 
difference between the two. 
Antonio Tizzano, in his discussion of implied 
powers in Community law comes to a conclusion 
entirely opposite to the Advocate-General's view. 
According to Tizzano reliance on Article 235 and 
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analogous provisions (Art. 95 (l) ECSC and Art. 203 
EAEC) is rendered necessary only when there is 
absolutely no possibility of granting powers to the 
institutions on the basis of express treaty 
provisions or by application of "all the principles 
developed • • by the Court of Justice for 
reconstituting and defining the system." (30 years 
of Community Law, 1983, p. 49). Tizzano argues that 
any other finding would "formally devalue'' the 
actions which have been taken by the Court regarding 
implied powers, and do away with all plausible 
explanations for the Court's continued vigorous use 
of the doctrine alongside wide reliance on Article 
235· 
Here one should note that at the time ERTA was 
decided, resort to Article 235 was extremely 
infrequent. The Advocate-General himself, after 
arguing that the Article made any use of wide 
interpretation unnecessary, admitted that its use 
was extremely difficult from a legal point of view, 
based on the provisions then in force. Thus, the 
question may have been resolved in the Court's eyes 
based on real problems involved in actual use of 
Article 235· Still, the issue must be reexamined in 
light of the Summit of Heads of State or Government 
held in Paris in 1972 (See Tizzano, supra, P• 51). 
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There the Member States expressed the opinion that 
it was "advisable to use as widely as possible all 
provisions of the Treaties, including Art. 
235 • " Following this announcement, which was 
reinforced by endorsements of this position each 
time EC institutions were asked to produce programs 
of action in sectors which required recourse to 
Article 235, use of the article become widespread. 
The necessity argument can be answered, however, in 
a way consistent with Tizzano's view, if the phrase 
"and this Treaty has not provided necessary powers" 
(Article 235) is read as including both express and 
implied powers and if the latter are considered as 
having come into existence at the time the Treaty 
was concluded. Only in a case where neither express 
or implied powers exist should Article 235 be relied 
upon. Going one step further, if an implied power 
is "discovered'' by the Court in an area which has 
earlier seen the use of Article 235, all future 
actions should be based on the implied power. 
However, the Court will not be able to find an 
implied power under these circumstances without 
concluding that the earlier use of Article 235 was 
unfounded, since the power in question did in fact 
exist in the Community, contrary to the requirements 
of Article 235· 
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ii. Court's Judgment 
The first point to take note of regarding the 
Court's judgment is its interpretation of Article 
210 which reads as follows: 
Article 210 EEC 
"The Community shall have legal personality." 
The Court's interpretation of the article appears in 
recital 14 of ERTA: 
Recital 14 
"This provision, placed at the head of Part Six 
of the Treaty, devoted to 'General and Final 
Provisions', means that in its external 
relations the Community enjoys the capacity to 
establish contractual links with third 
countries over the whole field of objectives 
defined in Part One of the Treaty, which Part 
Six supplements". 
It is difficult to imagine, from a literal reading 
of Article 210, how the Court made the jump from the 
wording of the article to the meaning they assign 
it. Recital 14 contains a clue that the Court 
itself was aware it was not intrepreting Article 210 
strictly, but instead pinpointing a meaning not 
expressly set down in the measure. For rather than 
conclude that the article "creates" a Community 
capacity in international affairs, the Court 
concludes that Article 210 "means that in its 
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external relations the Community enjoys the capacity 
to" make international agreements. 
A comparison of Article 6 ECSC with recital 14 
of ERTA reveals the probable source of the Court's 
reading of Article 210 EEC. Article 6 ECSC is the 
"equivalent" provision of the European Coal and 
Steel Community Treaty and reads, in part, as 
follows: 
Article 6 ECSC 
"The Community shall have legal personality. 
In international relations, the Community shall 
enjoy the legal capacity it requires to perform 
its functions and attain its objectives . " 
Thus, Article 6 ECSC begins with a sentence identical 
to the first sentence of Article 210 EEC, but it goes 
on to include a separate statement on the Community's 
legal capacity in international relations. An 
examination of this statement and a comparison of it 
to recital 14 of ERTA reveals a startling resemblance 
between the two. The key words in Article 6, 
"international relations", "legal capacity", and 
"objectives", have been transposed into recital 14 as 
"external relations", "capacity", and "objectives". 
Interestingly, Advocate-General Dutheillet de Lamothe 
seized upon the difference between Article 210 EEC and 
Article 6 ECSC as evidence that the authors of the 
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Rome Treaty intended to strictly limit the EC's 
authority in external matters to the cases laid down 
by the Treaty. The Court, however, blurs the 
distinction between the provisions by reading into 
Article 210 EEC the very terms it lacks when 
compared with Article 6 ECSC. By denying the 
Advocate-General's argument the Court takes a key 
step in creating the legal structure necessary to 
support powerful and varied actions by the Community 
in foreign affairs. 
The Court seems not to rely on the intention of 
the drafters of the Treaty or of the Member States 
in its interpretation of Article 210 EEC, but on a 
method similar to the one later used in Continental 
Can (1973) E.C.R.215 Case 6/72· There the 
defendants argued that Article 86 had been wrongly 
interpreted by the Commission as providing a basis 
for merger control in the EEC. The ECSC Treaty, the 
defendants pointed out, expressly provided for such 
control, but no such express provision appeared in 
the EEC Treaty. The Court rejected comparison of 
the two treaties with the object of proving the 
framers intent as a method of interpretation. 
Instead it looked to "the spirit, general scheme and 
wording of Article 86, as well as to the system and 
objectives of the Treaty". Although the Court found 
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for the defendant, it upheld the Commission's 
extensive interpretation of Article 86. The Court's 
interpretation in both ERTA and Continental Can can 
be regarded as examples of wide interpretation. It 
would be valuable to consider whether this differs 
at all from the method involved in finding implied 
powers, a subject which will be taken up in the 
analysis of the Natural Rubber opinion. 
The Court's key statements on the aspect of 
competence, in which it identified implied Community 
powers to conclude the European Road Transport 
Agreement, are contained in recitals 16 through 22: 
Recital 15 
"To determine in a particular case the 
Community's authority to enter into 
international agreements, regard must be had to 
the whole scheme of the Treaty no less than .to 
its substantive provisions". 
Recital 16 
"Such authority arises not only from an express 
conferment by the Treaty--as is the case with 
Articles 113 and 114 for tariff and trade 
agreements and with Article 238 for association 
agreements--but may equally flow from other 
provisions of the Treaty and from measures 
adopted, within the framework of those 
provisions, by the Community institutions". 
Recital 17 
"In particular, each time the Community, with a 
view to implementing a common policy envisaged 
by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down 
common rules, whatever form these may take, the 
Member States no longer have the right, acting 
individually or even collectively, to undertake 
obligations with third countries which affect 
those rules". 
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Recital 18 
"As and when such common rules come into being, 
the Community alone is in a position to assume 
and carry out contractual obligations towards 
third countries affecting the whole sphere of 
application of the Community legal system". 
Recital 19 
"With regard to the implementation of the 
provisions of the Treaty the system of internal 
Community measures may not therefore be 
separated from that of external relations". 
Recital 20 
"Under Article 3(c), the adoption of a common 
policy in the sphere of transport is specially 
mentioned amongst the objectives of the 
Community". 
Recital 21 
"Under Article 5, the Member States are 
required on the one hand to take all 
appropriate measures to ensure fulfillment of 
the obligations arising out of the Treaty or 
resulting from action taken by the institutions 
and, on the other hand, to abstain from any 
measure which might jeopardize the attainment 
of the objectives of the Treaty". 
Recital 22 
"If these two provisions are read in 
conjunction, it follows that to the extent to 
which Community rules are promulgated for the 
attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, the 
Member States cannot, outside the framework of 
the Community institutions, assume obligations 
which might affect those rules or alter their 
scope". 
These recitals are often analyzed as containing 
rules on the exclusivity of implied Community treaty-
making power, but in fact the very basis for those 
powers is revealed these recitals themselves. The 
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analysis of this phenomenon, however, is complicated 
by the fact that not one, but three, separate rules 
can be identified. These appear in recitals 17, 18 
and 22, and reflect variations on either the 
conditions under which a power to conclude 
international agreements will be found or the result 
of fulfillment of those conditions. The common 
feature of each recital lies in the fact that when 
its conditions are fulfilled the Member States are 
no longer capable of concluding a particular group 
of international agreements. 
The first of these rules, which appears in 
recital 17, can be used as an example. There the 
Court concludes that "each time the Community, with 
a view to implementing a common policy envisaged by 
the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common 
rules . • the Member States no longer have the 
right • • to undertake obligations with third 
countries which affect those rules". The key to 
conceptualizing this statement as a rule regarding 
powers, though it might seem at first to speak to 
exclusivity alone, is to look for its " . m~rror 
• 11 
:t.mage • Its mirror image is based on the fact that 
in a system of government like the Community, where 
authority is divided between the Community's 
institutions and the Member States, the treaty-
14 
making power must rest somewhere. Thus, the mirror 
image of recital 17 consists of the positive 
statement of Community treaty-making power which can 
be formulated based on the prohibitive statement of 
the recital itself. 
If one applies the "mirror image" approach to 
recital 17 of ERTA the positive rule which results 
reads as follows: 
Rule 1 
When the EC adopts common rules in order to 
implement a common policy envisaged by the 
Treaty, it has the authority to undertake 
obligations with 3rd States which would affect 
those rules. 
The second rule is located in recital 18 where it is 
presented, interestingly enough, in a positive 
statement rather than a negative one, making it 
unnecessary to apply the mirror image approach. 
Summarized in the same fashion as Rule 1, it reads: 
Rule 2 
When the EC adopts common rules in order to 
implement a common policy envisaged by the 
Treaty, it has the authority to assume and 
carry out obligations towards third states 
which would affect the whole sphere of 
application of the Community legal system. 
Like the first rule, the third is based on a 
prohibition of Member State action, in this case 
stated in recital 22. Applying the "mirror image" 
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approach, and summarizing the rule, it would read as 
follows: 
Rule 3 
When the EC adopts common rules in order to 
attain the objectives of the Treaty, to the 
extent those rules are promulgated to reach 
such objectives, the EC has the authority to 
assume obligations towards third states which 
might affect those rules or alter their scope. 
Support for the ''mirror image" approach is 
found in two decisions of the Court. The first, Van 
Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administrative (1963) 
ECR 1 Case 26/62, concerned a tariff classification 
made under Dutch law which the plaintiff challenged 
as being contrary to Article 12 EEC. In a 
preliminary ruling under Article 177 the Court noted 
that "the Community constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which the 
states have limited their sovereign rights " 
In Costa v. ENEL (1964) ECR 585 Case 6/64, also an 
Article 177 case, the Court gave even more direct 
support to the "mirror image" approach. Here the 
Court examined the Italian government's contention 
that a national court which was obliged to apply 
national law could not avail itself of Article 177· 
In its answer the Court found: 
"By creating a Community of unlimited duration, 
having its own institutions, its own 
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personality, its own legal capacity and 
capacity of representation on the international 
plane and, more particularly, real powers 
stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a 
transfer of powers from the states to the 
Community, the Member States have limited their 
sovereign rights • " 
The key phrase here is "real powers stemming from a 
limitation of sovereignty". 
J.A. Winter in his Annotation on Case 22/70 
gives support to the "mirror image" approach. 
Winter first notes that the Court did not explicitly 
say that if certain conditions were met the 
Community would obtain treaty-making power. 
Instead, he argues, the Court took pains to point 
out only that the Member States no longer have the 
right to conclude international agreements when such 
conditions are met, and that the Community alone is 
in a position (rather than "has authority") to 
conclude them. Thus, according to Winter, one is: 
"tempted to conclude that the general formula 
concerning the loss of state power in the 
external field cannot simply be applied to the 
question of whether the Community has come into 
the possession of treaty-making 
powers • • this would mean that the 
extinction of state authority in the external 
field would not automatically give rise to a 
Community authority to conclude international 
agreements". 
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In the end, Winter rejects this analysis with 
the observation that this line of thought, whatever 
its attractions, "leads to the wholly unacceptable 
conclusion that there may be occasions in which the 
treaty-making power is vested neither in the Member 
States, nor in the Community". Since a design that 
would deprive the Member States of power without 
allowing that power to be exercised by the Community 
could not be imputed to the Court, Winter concludes 
that an e~uivalent external power on the part of the 
EC must necessarily exist with regard to treaty-
making. 
Now that we have examined the techni~ue of 
deriving the rules of ERTA from the "mirror image'' 
approach, as well as case law and scholarly 
authority which lend support to the process, we can 
note that each of the three rules represents a 
different concept of EC treaty-
making authority and that each, if applied, would 
lead to different results. Before comparing the 
rules, 
asked. 
however, a preliminary ~uestion must be 
Are these really rules of implied powers? 
Implied powers are usually viewed as powers which 
are not expressly granted by a constituting 
document, but which are necessary in order that 
those expressly granted be functional. Yet an 
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examination of the above rules nowhere reveals the 
term "necessity." This dilemma can be explained if 
the rules are looked at as providing for an 
"automatic" finding of necessity if their conditions 
are fulfilled. 
The concept of automatic necessity has two 
important consequences. First, the Court frees 
itself from having to make an individual inquiry 
regarding the existence of necessity in every case 
where the Community might claim, or certain EC 
institutions might reject, treaty-making power based 
on internal competences. The second effect is 
related to the ongoing debate over whether necessity 
is a political concept leaving practically unlimited 
discretion to the competent institutions, or a legal 
principle that puts decision-making power in the 
hands of the Court, as described in Peter Bruckner's 
"Foreign affairs powers and policy in the Draft 
Treaty establishing the European Union" in Bieber, 
Jacque and Weiler (eds), An Ever Closer Union 
(1985).) Through its decision, the Court limited 
institutional discretion to decide the question of 
necessity. Once the conditions set up by the rules 
are fulfilled, the finding of an implied 
treaty-making power is automatic. The Council in 
particular, and the Member States, are forced to 
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accept EC treaty-making power. That power cannot be 
restored to the Member States by the institutions, 
as even the Council admitted in ERTA, where it 
stated that it had "no authority to 'restore' 
a power conferred on the Community by Treaty" (p. 
261). Remaining questions include whether these 
powers are exclusive and whether they can be 
delegated to the Member States, but first the 
similarities and differences between the three rules 
will be discussed. 
The rules are similar in that each mentions the 
adoption of common rules by the EC as a condition 
for finding Community treaty-making power. This 
fact led to great curiosity following the decision 
as to whether common rules would always be required 
for a finding of implied treaty-making power. The 
controversy was cleared up to some extent in The 
Rhine Case , where the Court, after stating that a 
grant of internal power implied external power as 
well, concluded that: "This is particularly so in 
all cases in which internal power has already been 
used in order to adopt measures which come within 
the attainment of common policies. 
not limited to that eventuality". 
It is, however, 
The Rhine Case, 
however, did not clarify the issue entirely since in 
the situation envisaged there competence would not 
be exclusive. 
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The three rules differ in important ways as 
well, the most striking being Rule l's reference to 
"~ommon rules in order to implement a common 
policy", which can be compared with "common rules in 
order to attain the objectives of the Treaty" of 
Rule 3· 
Clearly, Rule 1 is narrower than Rule 3, 
but how much narrower is uncertain. 
"Common policy" 
is a term used in the Treaty to refer to three 
specific areas of Community action: 
the common 
commercial policy towards third countries, common 
agriculture policy, and common transport policy. 
Each of these is mentioned in Article 3 as an 
activity of the Community, and to each a subse~uent 
section of the Treaty is devoted· Yet it is not 
uncommon for commentators to refer to areas other 
than these when discussing the Community's "common 
policies"· 
Stein, Hay and Waelbroeck, for example, 
in their textbook "European Community Law and 
Institutions in Perspective" devote a chapter to 
"common policies" within which they discuss social, 
regional, industrial, transportation, energy, 
environmental, economic and monetary policies of the 
Community. 
Interestingly, they do not even mention 
the common agricultural policy or common commercial 
policy and they include a variety of subjects which 
are not referred to as "common policies" by the 
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Treaty. Articles 103 through 109 for example, which 
the authors refer to as being concerned with 
economic and monetary policy, mainly provide for a 
coordination of national powers, and by the authors' 
admission give Community institutions very few 
powers. Part of the confusion may result from the 
Treaty itself, which under Part 3, "Policy of the 
Community", refers only to the common commercial 
policy (Articles 110-116). The common agricultural 
policy (Arts. 38-47) and common transport policy 
(Articles 74-89) are found instead in Part 2, 
"Foundations of the Community". 
No matter how one chooses to define "common 
policy", rules adopted "in order to attain 
objectives of the Treaty" must certainly be 
broader. Recital 14 of ERTA refers to Part One of 
the Treaty as laying down a "field of objectives". 
The preamble, as well, can be viewed as setting 
forth objectives, although the legal force of that 
section might be questioned. The extremely broad 
goals listed there like "economic and social 
progress" and "the constant improvement 
of • • living and working conditions", which is 
actually described as "the essential objective" of 
the treaty-makers, cause one to hesitate before 
assuming that the Court meant to refer to so much. 
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Looking at Part One alone, however, reveals a host 
of possibilities. Article 3 of Part One mentions 
~the institution of a system ensuring that 
competition in the common market is not distorted" 
as an activity of the Community. As this is a 
Community objective, under Rule 3 of ~' 
agreements with third states could be concluded 
based on common rules adopted under Articles 85-95, 
which set up the system for Community regulation of 
competition. The approximation of laws "to the 
extent required for the proper functioning of the 
common market" is mentioned as a Community activity 
by Article 3 as well· Here again, agreements with 
third states could be signed, this time based on 
common rules adopted under Articles 100-102, titled 
"Approximation of Laws''. One might even argue that 
all internal rules are adopted in order to meet 
Community objectives, directly, or indirectly, which 
would lead to quite an extensive treaty-making power 
indeed. 
Rule 3's reference to the "objectives'' of the 
Treaty calls to mind the description of capacity 
based on Article 210 in recital 14· It should be 
noted, however, that the two statements are not 
identical. Rule 3's definition of treaty-making 
power is not so broad as to merge with recital l4's 
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definition of capacity. The conclusion of 
agreements is not allowed whenever necessary to meet 
the objectives of the Community. Instead it is 
acceptable only when common rules to meet those 
objectives have been adopted. Thus, a situation 
where external powers would exist without matching 
internal powers is avoided. In fact, a rule 
allowing treaty-making based on Treaty objectives 
alone would not be a rule of implied powers under 
the usual meaning of the term, since underlying 
powers which require the implication of further, 
nonexpress powers, would not even exist. This 
possibility, which would be a reversal of the 
doctrine of parallelism, does not arise under any of 
the three ERTA rules since the adoption of common 
rules ensures that internal powers already exist. 
Thus the inclusion of the phrase ''carry out" was 
unnecessary in Rules 1 and 3· 
Rule 2 is the most problematic of the three 
rules since the meaning of obligations "which would 
affect the whole sphere of the Community legal 
system" is unclear. It seems to represent an 
intermediate position between Rules 1 and 3· Like 
Rule 1, it only takes effect in relation to common 
policies of the Community. But instead of 
supporting only those agreements which would affect 
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common internal rules which have already been 
adopted, it may have been meant to provide 
treaty-making powers in the whole "sphere" of a 
common policy, even in an area where internal rules 
have not yet adopted. 
Another important difference exists in relation 
to which body has the ability to characterize the 
aim of common provisions under the various rules. 
In recital 17 the Court concludes that "each time 
the Community, with a view to implementing a common 
policy • adopts provisions • • the Member 
States no longer have the right • • to undertake 
obligations which affect those rules". In recital 
22 the words "with a view to implementing a common 
policy" are replaced by "to the extent to which 
Community rules are promulgated for the attainment 
of the objectives of the Treaty". The first version 
represents a subjective test of intent. The phrase 
"with a view to • ." calls for a judicial inquiry 
which is limited to discovering the goals which the 
institutions hoped to achieve through their 
legislation. The second version, in contrast, could 
be interpreted as either a subjective test, or as an 
objective test in which the Court itself will make 
the determination as to the true objective of 
internal rules. The latter possibility would 
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represent increased willingness on the part of the 
Court to monitor the legislative process, and if 
adopted in future cases would represent increased 
judicial activism. 
We have already seen that Rule 3 is broader 
than Rules l and 2 in that the former refers to 
Treaty "objectives" while the latter mention common 
policies envisaged by the Treaty. This fact is 
reinforced by wording that appears at the end of 
each rule. In Rules l and 2 the Court concludes 
that the Member States no longer have the right to 
undertake obligations which affect those rules. 
Rule 3, however, forbids Member States obligations 
which might affect those rules or alter their 
scope. Thus, in Rule 3 it seems that absolute 
certainty of an effect on internal rules is not 
required to trigger a mirror image finding of 
implied powers. 
When the ultimate holding of the Court is 
examined in ERTA it appears for an instant that the 
Court has made a complete turn-around in the final 
stages of its decision. For in the end, it allows 
the Member States to conclude the European Road 
Transport Agreement though it earlier found that 
power resided in the hands of the Community alone. 
Close examination of recitals 90 and 91, however, 
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shows that the Court did not retreat from its 
earlier analysis in the ultimate paragraphs. In 
recital 90 the Court found that "in carrying on the 
negotiations and concluding the agreement 
simultaneously in the manner decided on by the 
Council, the Member States acted, and continue to 
act, in the interest and on behalf of the 
Community • " It went on in recital 91 to find 
that "in deciding in these circumstances on joint 
action by the Member States, the Council has not 
failed in its obligations • " The words "in the 
manner decided on by the Council" and " . ln 
deciding • • on joint action" make quite clear the 
Court's view that Member States' action was 
dependent upon authority delegated by the Council. 
Thus the determination as to the division of power 
set out earlier in the opinion is left in place 
despite the decision to allow the Member States' 
action to stand. 
One particular problem which comes up under the 
analysis of ERTA presented so far simply cannot be 
ignored. It is possible that an agreement's effect 
on internal rules may lead to Community power to 
make a Treaty the purpose of which does not fall 
within the Community's objectives under the Treaty. 
One possibility would be for the Court to try and 
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read the Community's objectives broadly enough to 
cover a particular treaty, but it is easy enough to 
imagine that there might be occasions when an 
agreement would still be out of the Community's 
reach. A second possibility would be for the Court 
to insist on treaty amendment to enlarge the 
objectives set out for the Community there. For 
practical reasons this would be unworkable. Treaty 
amendment is a difficult process and the problems of 
reaching an agreement could make it effectively 
impossible to accomplish, thus creating the legal 
vacuum so essential to avoid. A third alternative 
would consist of "mixed agreements", in other words, 
the process by which Member States and the Community 
together negotiate and conclude an agreement with 
third countries. The Court could rule that where a 
particular agreement came within the Community's 
powers because it "would" or ''might" affect internal 
rules, it would have to join with the Member States 
in order to act because the objectives of the 
agreement were not amongst the objectives of the 
EC. The problem with this approach is that in the 
case of implied treaty-making power based on ERTA's 
rules of automatic implied power, the Community's 
power is by nature exclusive, since it mirrors a 
primary finding that the Member States cannot act. 
28 
A fourth and final alternative which would solve the 
exclusivity problem would be to conclude that the 
Community can sometimes take action based on its 
powers even when the objectives sought are outside 
its own scope. This would seem to be supportable in 
particular if a requirement of unanimity was imposed 
upon any such action. The Community has in fact 
applied economic sanctions under these very 
circumstances, a phenomenon which shall now be 
looked at in greater detail. 
The problem of economic sanctions developed out 
of the fact that the Community exercises exclusive 
power over the common commercial policy under 
Article 113. The Member States can apply economic 
sanctions under Article 224 alone, which creates an 
exception in favor of Member State action based upon 
the existence of a security interest. In this 
situation, if a security interest does not exist, 
the danger of a legal vacuum is present since 
economic sanctions are applied primarily for 
political reasons and would therefore seem to be 
outside the scope of acceptable Community action. 
This potential vacuum has been filled, however, by 
Community action based on Article 113. 
In a key example of Community action under 
these circumstances, the Council adopted Regulation 
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No. 877/82, thereby suspending for one month the 
importof all products originating in Argentina (O.J. 
1982, L 102/1 of 16 April 1982). The regulation was 
based on Article 113 of the EEC Treaty. Pieter Jan 
Kuyper in "Community Sanctions against Argentina: 
Lawfullness under Community and International Law" 
(Essays in European Law and Integration, P• 141), 
describes these measures as being in strong contrast 
to those taken one month earlier against the Soviet 
Union in relation to the crisis in Poland. In the 
latter case, the essential provisions were buried in 
a highly technical Council Regulation for the 
amendment of the import regime for particular 
products originating in the USSR. 
As Kuyper writes, "The Argentine case is, however, 
the first one in which the nature of measures can be 
openly gauged from the terms of the Regulation. 
This can be characterized without any doubt as an 
important milestone in the development of the 
Communities". 
Thus there is evidence that in at least one 
context, the Community has exercised its powers in 
order to achieve objectives outside the scope of 
those mentioned in the Treaties. It seems that a 
similar strategy would offer the best solution for 
the problem of treaty-making in areas of exclusive 
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Community power generally, and in particular in 
relation to implied powers resulting from ERTA's 
rules. 
An analysis of ERTA would not be complete 
without some discussion of the institutional 
workings of the Court. The fact that dissenting 
opinions are forbidden, and the fact that the Court 
must reach a unanimous result, has led to the 
variety of rules presented by the Court. Close 
reading of the opinion reveals two major conflicts: 
the first over whether an individual finding of 
necessity or a broader, "automatic" rule should 
serve as the basis for finding implied power, and 
the second relating to which broad rule in 
particular should be adopted. The latter fact has 
already been discussed in detail, but the former is 
worthy of note. There seems to have been a desire 
on the part of the judges favoring a broad rule to 
make their reasoning express, but it appears that a 
compromise on the Court tempered this formulation. 
Thus two of the three ERTA rules were framed in the 
negative, as restraints on Member State action, 
while the third, Rule 2, though coming closest to a 
positive statement of power, still contains somewhat 
ambiguous terms. 
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Recital 18 (Rule 2), we can remember, states 
that "As and when such common rules come into being, 
the Community alone is in a position to assume and 
carry out contractual obligations towards third 
countries • " The words "in a position to" are 
curiously vague, and thus it may be worthwhile to 
compare them to the French version, which is the 
original language of the case. There the Court 
states: "qu'en effet, au fur et a mesure de 
l'instauration de ces regles communes, la Communaute 
seule est en mesure d'assumer et d'executer, avec 
effet pour l'ensemble du domaine d'application de 
l'ordre juridique communautaire, les engagements 
contractes a l'egard d'Etats tiers". A search for 
the meaning of the term "etre en mesure de" reveals 
two possibilities in particular: the first is "in a 
position to", and the second "having the power to". 
The Larousse Dictionnaire Moderne Francais-Anglais 
includes the terms "to be in a position to" and "to 
have the power to". According to Harrap's New 
Standard French and English Dictionary the phrase 
can be translated as "to be in a position to", to 
have the power to", or "to be able to". It appears 
that "etre en mesure de" was selected as a 
compromise term by members of the Court who 
disagreed over whether a broad, "automatic" rule of 
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implied powers should be formulated. 
An examination of the passages which follow the 
Court's enunciation of the three ERTA rules supports 
this view. From recital 23 onwards a series of 
findings are made which can only be interpreted as a 
separate finding of the existence of necessity 
applicable in this case alone. In recital 23 we are 
told that the objectives of the Treaty in transport 
matters are to be pursued within the framework of a 
common policy. In recitals 24 and 25 specific 
powers of the Community in relation to transport are 
mentioned. In recitals 26 and 27 the Court notes 
that the provision creating these powers is "equally 
concerned" with transport to and from third 
countries and thus "assumes that the powers of the 
Community • involve the need in the sphere in 
question for agreements with the third countries 
concerned". The usual elements in an implied powers 
finding by the Court are present here: express 
powers are mentioned in conjunction with objectives 
whose achievement they were meant to ensure, and a 
need for unenumerated powers is referred to. Had 
there been full agreement on the broad rules laid 
down in recitals 17 through 22 there would have been 
no reason to include this separate finding of 
implied powers. The presence of these recitals does 
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not derogate from the force and affect of ERTA's 
broad rules, but it serves to illustrate a dispute 
over reasoning amongst the justices in a case in 
which all the members of the Court clearly agreed 
only on the result. 
2. Opinion on the Draft Agreement for a Local Cost 
Standard 
a. Facts 
Opinion 1/75 resulted from a Commission request 
for an opinion of the European Court of Justice 
under Article 228 (1). The object of the request 
was to determine the compatibility of the draft 
"Understanding on a Local Cost Standard", drawn up 
under the auspices of the OECD, with the EEC 
Treaty. More specifically, the Commission asked 
whether the Community had the power to conclude the 
Understanding, and if so, whether that power was 
exclusive. 
Prior to their request, the Commission had 
conveyed to the Council a recommendation for a 
decision in regard to the Community's position 
within the OECD on the Standard. Under the 
Recommendation, which was based on Article 113 of 
the EEC Treaty, the Commission would express the 
Community's position as laid out in the directives 
annexed. 
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b. Opinion 
After ruling that there was no reason the 
request for an opinion should not be admitted, the 
court moved to the question of whether a Community 
power existed to conclude the Understanding. The 
Court examined Articles 112 and 113 in formulating a 
reply. According to the Court, under Article 112 
"the member states shall, before the end of the 
transitional period, progressively harmonize the 
systems whereby they grant aid for exports to third 
countries, to the extent necessary to ensure that 
competition between undertakings of the Community is 
not distorted". Since the grant of export credits 
clearly fell within the system of aids granted by 
Member States for exports, the subject-matter of the 
standard laid down in the Understanding clearly 
related to a field in which the Treaty expressly 
recognized a Community power. In addition, the 
Court found that according to Article 113, "the 
common commercial policy shall be based on uniform 
principles, particularly in regard to • • export 
policy • " The Court stated that export policy, 
and common commercial policy more generally, 
necessarily covered the subject-matter of the 
Understanding. Thus, "the subject-matter covered by 
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the standard contained in the Understanding in 
q_uestion" fell "within the ambit of the Community's 
11 
-powers • 
Next the Court examined whether an agreement 
made within a common commercial policy area could be 
made prior to the adoption of internal rules on the 
same subject. The Court found that "A Commercial 
policy is in fact made up by the combination and 
interaction of internal and external measures. 
Sometimes agreements are concluded in execution of a 
policy fixed in advance, sometimes that policy is 
defined by the Agreements themselves". The Court 
also seemed to support the idea that it might be 
acceptable in some cases to conclude international 
Agreements without adopting internal measures at 
all, or at least not simultaneously. This 
conclusion follows from the Court's finding that 
"the implementation of the export policy to be 
pursued within the framework of a common commercial 
policy does not necessarily find expression in the 
adoption of general and abstract rules of internal 
or Community law". 
Finally, the Court noted that the common 
commercial policy was conceived for the defense of 
the common interests of the Community, and that this 
conception was "incompatible within the freedom to 
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which the member states could lay claim by invoking 
a concurrent power so as to ensure that their own 
interests were separately satisfied in external 
relations, at the risk of compromising the effective 
defense of the common interests of the Community". 
Therefore the Member States could not be allowed to 
exercise concurrent power in either the Community or 
international sphere. The fact that the obligations 
and financial burdens inherent in executing the 
agreement would be borne by the Member States was 
found not to influence the result. 
c. Analysis 
Opinion 1/75 dealt with the express 
treaty-making power granted to the Community in 
regard to the common commercial policy. That fact 
alone does not preclude use of the doctrine of 
implied powers since it can function to expand 
express treaty-making power, as well as create new 
treaty-making powers, as we shall see when we look 
at the Natural Rubber opinion. In Opinion 1/75, 
however, reliance on the doctrine was unnecessary as 
the Court found the Understanding was directly 
covered by the terms of the common commercial 
policy. Though not directly related to the issue of 
implied powers, the Opinion still constitutes a link 
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in the chain of treaty-making cases. It is 
consistent with ERTA in that both cases reject the 
-possibility of concurrent Member State treaty-making 
authority. The Court's concern in both is unity and 
uniformity within the Common Market. One should 
note though that in Opinion l/75 the Court avoided a 
broad statement that would cover all common 
commercial policy agreements. Instead the finding 
was that: 
"It cannot therefore be accepted that, in a 
field such as that governed by the 
Understanding in question, which is covered by 
export policy and more generally by the common 
commercial policy, the Member States should 
exercise a power concurrent to that of the 
Community, in the Community sphere and in the 
international sphere". 
Most importantly, the opinion foreshadows the 
handling of an important issue in the implied powers 
area--the necessity for common internal rules prior 
to a finding of implied treaty-making power. The 
Court's finding that common rules need not be 
adopted prior to use of the express treaty-making 
power granted in Article 113, was adapted to apply 
to a somewhat different situation in the context of 
Opinion l/76. There the Court concluded that the 
fact that express internal power had not yet been 
used to adopt internal measures would not preclude a 
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finding of the existence of a necessity for implied 
treaty-making powers. According to the Court it was 
Pparticularly so" that an express external power 
would lead to an implied external power in a case 
where internal power had already been used to adopt 
measures, but this result was "not limited to that 
eventuality". 
The Kramer Case: Cornelis Kramer and others, Joined 
Cases, 3, 4 and 6/76 
a. Facts 
The Kramer Case came before the European Court 
of Justice as the result of criminal proceedings 
brought against various Netherlands fisherman 
(Cornelis Kramer and others) accused of 
infringing rules enacted by the Netherlands 
government. Those rules were adopted in order to 
carry out an agreement which had been worked out 
between the Netherlands, certain other Member States 
of the Community, and third countries within the 
context of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries 
Convention (NEAFC). The fishermen, amongst the 
elements of their defense, argued that the 
Agreement's conclusion fell within the powers of the 
Community alone, and therefore should not have been 
entered into by the Netherlands government. Thus, 
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it was argued, the national measures adopted to 
carry out the agreement were incompatible with 
Community law, and therefore, were invalid as a 
basis for criminal proceedings. 
Because all of the defendants in the 
proceedings argued that the measures were 
incompatible with Community law, the Netherlands 
District Courts decided to request a preliminary 
ruling on the interrelation of certain legal 
provisions under Article 177· The first question 
they asked the Court was whether the Member States 
possessed the power to fix quotas like the ones 
imposed by Netherlands legislation. The second 
question inquired into whether the Community held an 
exclusive power to conclude agreements whose 
objective was to maintain fish stocks. Third, they 
asked whether quotas like those laid down by the 
Netherlands were compatible with Community law. 
Finally, they inquired as to whether specified 
Treaty provisions were directly applicable within 
the Member States. 
b. Advocate-General's Opinion 
Advocate-General Trabucchi suggested that the 
first task in responding to the District Court's 
request was to establish whether the power to 
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conclude international agreements for the 
conservation of fishery resources belonged 
exclusively to the Community or whether the Member 
States could still act on their own account taking 
into consideration, in light of the ERTA decision, 
the fact that Community legislation governing the 
fishing industry had already come into force. 
The Advocate-General suggested that if it 
should be found that the Member States did not 
possess a power of this sort, there would be no need 
to answer the other questions. On the other hand, 
should it be determined that the Member States did 
possess power in this area, the question would be 
whether they could legitimately lay down 
restrictions of the type they imposed, which 
included quotas, in view of the Community's common 
rules. 
Advocate-General Trabucchi noted that the 
opinion of third states, and any difficulties which 
they might place in the way of the Community's 
participation in the NEAFC, could have no effect on 
the identification of powers conferred upon the 
Community by the Treaty system. The 
Advocate-General then stated that "the 
interpretation of Community law leads me to the 
conclusion that, even on an international level, 
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provision can be made for conservation of fish 
stocks only by the Community". Resistance by third 
states, he found, could not serve to deprive the 
Community of its powers or transfer them back to the 
Member States. In case of such resistance, "the 
Community could authorize its Member States to act 
on its behalf, sticking strictly to the guidelines 
which it laid down for them". The Advocate-General 
pointed out that the fact that objectives pursued by 
the States in accepting restrictions on the freedom 
to fish were both sound and necessary, should not 
obscure the fact that ecological issues were not the 
only ones involved. International regulation of 
fishing involved an important economic and 
commercial aspect as well, which should be taken 
into account in deciding what sorts of international 
measures should be agreed to. In the end, the 
Advocate-General concluded that there was no doubt 
the Community had been vested with authority to 
negotiate and conclude international agreements 
dealing with control of fishing on the high seas. 
On the ~uestion of whether the Member States were 
still entitled to act in this area, however, the 
Advocate-General stated that, at least on a 
transitional basis, the Member States had limited 
residual authority to enter into international 
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commitments in connection with conservation of fish 
stocks. 
c. Judgment 
The Court refashioned the questions put to it, 
so that it first examined the authority of the 
Community to enter into the NEAFC agreement. On 
this point it concluded that the Community possessed 
an implied power to conclude international 
agreements for the conservation of biological 
resources of the sea. On the Member States' power 
to assume similar commitments it found that they 
possessed transitional concurrent authority in the 
area being investigated, which had existed when the 
matter arose before the District Courts but which 
would end when the Council adopted common measures 
for sea resource conservation as required by Article 
102 of the Act of Accession. According to the 
Court, the direct applicability of the Treaty 
provisions was irrelevant based on the answers to 
the earlier questions. 
d. Analysis 
i. Advocate General's Opinion 
Early in Advocate-General Trabucchi's opinion a 
restatement of the principle embodied in the ERTA 
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judgment can be found. According to Trabucchi, the 
judgment embodied the principle "that the exercise, 
-in any specific field, of the Community's internal 
legislative powers implies that the Community is 
alone vested with the powers, hitherto possessed by 
its Member States, to enter into international 
commitments in that particular field". 
The Advocate-General's restatement can be 
contrasted with a description of the ERTA principle 
given by Professor Michel Waelbroeck in his article 
titled "The Emergent Doctrine of Community 
Pre-emption--Consent and Re-delegation" in Courts 
and Free Markets, vol. 2. The comparison sheds 
light on the Advocate-General's reading of the rule 
in ERTA, both in terms of the finding of necessity 
generally, and the three distinct rules in the 
case. Waelbroeck, in describing the decision, 
writes that "Whenever the Community has, in the 
exercise of its internal powers, adopted common 
rules in a specified area, and it is necessary for 
international commitments to be entered into in 
respect of that same area, the Community has the 
power to enter into such commitments". 
There is a crucial difference between these two 
descriptions of the ERTA rule: Waelbroeck inserts 
the phrase "and it is necessary for international 
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agreements to be entered into" into his reading of 
the case, while Advocate-General Trabucchi seems to 
-have read ERTA as providing for implied powers 
automatically upon fulfillment of the conditions set 
out in the case by the Court. In other words, 
Trabucchi, in contrast to Waelbroeck, did not view 
the ERTA decision as requiring a "second look" into 
the necessity of treaty-making powers following a 
finding that the conditions set out in the rules 
were fulfilled. 
At the same time, the readings of ERTA by 
Trabucchi and Waelbroeck are similar in one 
interesting respect. Trabucchi refers to rules "in 
any specific field • ." while Waelbroeck uses the 
term "in a specified area". The fact is, that the 
first and second rules refer to common measures in 
the area of "a common policy", while the third 
refers to common rules "promulgated for the 
attainment of the objectives of the Treaty". That 
ERTA sets up different boundries for the application 
of its principles thus seems to have been perceived 
by both Waelbroeck and Trabucchi. They avoid the 
inconsistent nature of recitals 17, 18, and 22 of 
ERTA by not specifically defining the area of 
application of the rules they describe. 
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Following his restatement of the principle 
embodied in ERTA, the Advocate-General Trabucchi 
discusses the idea that power to enter into 
international agreements could result from internal 
rules regardless of whether the agreements in 
question would apply inside or outside the 
geographical area subject to the sovereignty of the 
Member States. He notes that "the automatic 
extension of internal Community powers to the 
external field has its raison d'etre and legal 
justification in the functional relationship which 
exists between the exercise of the external powers 
and the exercise of the internal powers in the same 
field". This wording is striking in Trabucchi's use 
of the term "automatic" to characterize the process 
through which the Community's exercise of internal 
legislative powers results in implied external 
powers in the same area. The Advocate-General then 
proceeds, in a fashion consistent with ERTA, to 
analyze the process of making the determination that 
implied external Community powers exist. According 
to the Advocate-General: 
"when • • external powers • • directly 
affect a sector which, in the Community, is 
already governed by common legislation and can, 
therefore, affect the functioning of the common 
machinery and rules laid down by the Community 
for that sphere of activity, it is essential to 
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establish that functional relationship between 
internal powers and external powers which 
requires the Community to assume also the 
latter powers in conjunction with the actual 
exercise of its internal legislative powers in 
the sector concerned". 
Thus we see Trabucchi doing exactly what one would 
expect him to do based on our earlier analysis of 
the ERTA case. He relies on an "effects test", 
through which he examines whether the use of 
external power will affect internal rules in order 
to determine whether Community powers exist. 
Underlying this discussion is the idea that what is 
at stake is actual Community power, not limitations 
on the use of their own powers by the Member 
States. This is consistent with ERTA, which also 
avoids as the basis for its reasoning the concept of 
Member State self-restraint as required by Article 5 
of the Treaty. That provision requires that Member 
States "abstain from any measure which could 
jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this 
treaty". The other interesting feature of this 
statement by the Advocate-General is his use of the 
phrase "can • • affect" rather than "would • 
affect" or "do • • affect". By this Trabucchi 
makes clear that the affect of external powers on 
internal rules need not be certain. This is 
consistent with Rule 3 of ERTA, which refers to 
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international agreements which "might affect those 
rules or alter their scope" as opposed to Rules 1 
-and 2 which describe obligations "which affect those 
rules". 
In Section 4 of his opinion Advocate-General 
Trabucchi sets about actually comparing the NEAFC 
agreement to Regulations No. 2141/70 and No. 
2142/70. Regard must be given, he concludes, to the 
"actual tenor and the aims'' of the rules involved in 
order to determine whether the Community's rules 
were such as to prevent the Member States from 
acting. He reviews the content of the regulations 
and characterizes No. 2141/70 as laying down common 
rules for fishing, setting up a pattern of 
coordination among the Member States in regard to 
their structural policies for the fishing industry, 
and providing for action which would contribute to 
the improvement of productivity and production and 
marketing conditions. Regulation No. 2142/70, he 
concludes, provided for the establishment of 
producers' organizations, a pricing system, and a 
system of trade with third countries. The Advocate-
General then points out that in ERTA the Community 
provisions and the agreement concerned had "one and 
the same purpose" while Kramer could be 
distinguished from this, since the regulations 
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described did not involve substantive rules on 
conservation but only a vesting of the Community 
-with power that had not yet been exercised. The 
Advocate-General finally stated that the issue of 
whether the Member States could "continue on their 
own account to enter international agreements" 
required "the aim of the international agreement in 
question to be viewed in the light of the aim of the 
common market rules". 
Advocate-General Trabucchi's emphasis on the 
aim of common Community rules in Kramer appears to 
conflict with the ERTA principle. According to the 
ERTA rules, "purpose" was relevant only in defining 
the group of internal Community measures which when 
"affected" by an international agreement would 
result in Community power. We can remember here the 
reference in recitals 17 and 18 to common rules 
adopted "with a view to implementing a common 
policy" and recital 22's mention of Community rules 
"promulgated for the attainment of the objectives of 
the Treaty". The ERTA decision, however, does not 
condition the application of the principle which 
results in an automatic finding of implied powers on 
a finding that the purpose of internal measures and 
an agreement is the same, as the Advocate-General 
seems to suggest. Even if a situation existed where 
49 
for example, the object of an international 
agreement under consideration by the Member States 
was conservation and internal Community measures 
were passed in order to set down a common structural 
policy for fishing, the "automatic rule" of implied 
powers in ERTA should still apply. As mentioned 
earlier in the analysis of ERTA, it is possible to 
imagine a situation where the purpose of a Member 
State agreement might not even be among the 
objectives of the Community as set out in the 
treaty, and yet part or all of that agreement would 
be outside the power of the Member State for 
affecting internal Community rules. This would hold 
true even though the purpose of the agreement was 
not among the Community's objectives, and as 
described earlier, should be seen as resulting in a 
situation where the Community might even act outside 
the scope of its set objectives. If a difference in 
purpose were allowed to mean that a Member State 
agreement would stand, though in conflict with 
internal Community measures, the whole treaty scheme 
might be subverted since common internal policies 
could be thwarted by conflicting, localized treaties. 
The Advocate-General mentioned the importance 
of the "tenor" of Community common measures in his 
opinion as well. The meaning of the term is not 
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well fixed, but the combination of "tenor" and "aim" 
(discussed above) seems in spirit compatible with a 
British argument contained in the summary of 
observations submitted to the Court. That argument 
for limiting application of the ERTA rule went as 
follows: 
"The Court's judgment in the ERTA case 
gives rise to difficulties of interpretation 
particularly with regard to ground 17 of the 
judgment which states that when the Community 
'adopts provisions laying down common rules' 
Member States are no longer entitled to enter 
into obligations with third countries which 
affect those rules: In the opinion of the 
British Government this doctrine does not apply 
if, as is the case in those proceedings, the 
subject-matter of the 'common rules' and the 
agreement entered into with third countries are 
not identical". 
There is no clear statement in the ERTA decision 
supporting either the British government's attempt 
based on subject-matter, or the Advocate-General's 
effort founded on purpose, to limit the principle of 
the case. This fact is emphasized by the failure of 
both the British government and the Advocate-General 
to cite any part of the decision in support of their 
arguments. This would certainly have been a logical 
step had the opportunity existed. An analysis of the 
Kramer judgment reveals no clue that the Court has 
chosen to accept these limitations. 
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ii. Court's Judgment 
Looking at recital 17/18 we see that the Court 
prepared the way for a finding of implied powers, as 
in ERTA, by reading Article 210 to mean that the 
Community "enjoys the capacity to enter 
international commitments over the whole field of 
objectives defined in part one of the treaty • " 
When it moved on to a discussion of the Community's 
authority, however, it was necessary to expand upon 
the ERTA statement to take account of the fact that 
the Act of Accession, rather than the Treaty alone, 
would serve as the basis for finding implied powers 
in Kramer. As a result, the Court concluded that 
"regard must be had to the whole scheme of Community 
law" instead of ''the whole scheme of the Treaty", 
which was the formulation utilized in ERTA. This 
point was emphasized in recital 19/20, where the 
Court ruled that "such authority arises not only 
from an express conferment by the treaty, but may 
equally flow implicitly from other provision of the 
Treaty, from the Act of Accession and from measures 
adopted, within the framework of those provisions, 
by the Community institutions". The equivalent 
statement in ERTA is nearly identical, but does not 
contain the words "Act of Accession", which in fact 
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had not been adopted at the time the ERTA case was 
decided. 
Another interesting difference between the ERTA 
and Kramer versions of this recital is the addition 
of the word "implicity" in the latter of the two. 
Recital 16 in ERTA simply states that the "authority 
to enter into international agreements • • arises 
not only from an express conferment • • • but may 
equally flow from other provisions. • ", while in 
Kramer the phrase is, "may equally flow implicitly 
from other provisions". The addition of the word 
"implicitly'' was not essential to the result, but it 
functions to make even more clear the Court's 
reliance on the doctrine of implied powers to expand 
the Community's express treaty-making power. 
The Kramer and ERTA decisions can be contrasted 
in terms of the method used to detect implied 
treaty-making authority. In ERTA the Court used a 
one-step process in which the power to regulate 
transportation internally was found to necessitate 
the power to conclude international agreements in 
the same area. The Court relied instead on a 
two-step process in Kramer. First it determined 
that the Community's power to regulate fishing 
internally extended outside the territorial waters 
of the Member States to the high seas. 
concluded in recital 30/33 that: 
Then it 
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"The only way to ensure the conservation 
of the biological resources of the sea both 
effectively and equitably is through a system 
of rules binding on all the States concerned, 
including non-member countries. In these 
circumstances it follows from the very duties 
and powers which Community law has 
established ••• on the internal level that 
the Community has authority to enter into 
international commitments for the conservation 
of the resources of the sea". 
This two-step process was necessary because the 
factual situation was different in Kramer than in 
ERTA. The activity to be regulated took place not 
solely in Member State territory, but in part upon 
waters outside their jurisdiction. This situation 
could actually have arisen in ERTA had the 
contemplated agreement covered shipping on the high 
seas as well as road transportation. 
The Court's two-step process in Kramer is 
interesting in that it raises the possibility that 
the Court may be willing to base implied 
treaty-making power on internal powers which are 
themselves implied. External power in these 
circumstances could be thought of as "secondary 
implied power". This possibility follows from the 
recital 30/33 finding that the Community's internal 
power to regulate fishing on the high seas results 
from "Article 102 of the Act of Accession, from 
Article 1 of the said regulation and moreover from 
54 
the very nature of things • " One could argue, 
based on the word 11 lt moreover , that even without the 
-previously listed express sources of internal 
Community power to regulate this area, the Court 
would have found an implied power based on the 
"nature of things". In fact, according to F. 
Burrows in "The Effects of the Main Cases of the 
Court of Justice in the Field of the Member States", 
these previously listed sources do not provide the 
power to make internal rules regulating fishing on 
the high seas. Burrows asks what the authority is 
for the proposition that the Community has the power 
to adopt these sorts of rules and concludes that 
"There was nothing in the EEC Treaty, the 
regulations cited or the Act of Accession which said 
anything of the kind". Thus, in Burrow's mind "The 
only guidance we are given in the judgment as to the 
origin of this legislative power is that it follows 
'from the nature of things'". What, then, is "the 
very nature of things" in terms of the Court's 
interpretive method? E.L.M. Volker characterizes 
this statement in his "Contribution to the 
Discussion" at the Amsterdam Colloquium on Division 
of powers between the European Communities and their 
Member States in the field of external relations. 
According to Volker: 
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"As regards the conclusion, that 'the rule-
making authority extends to the high seas', is 
based on the internal power of the Communities 
combined with 'the nature of things', this 
indicates no more than the--by now 
familiar--necessity criteria laid down by the 
Court in its earlier judgments. This can be 
read from the next sentence in the judgment, 
i.e. that this is the only way in which this 
matter can be dealt with effectively and 
equitably". 
It is clear from the above that Volker views 
the phrase "the nature of things" as an example of 
Court reliance on the doctrine of implied powers. 
If both Burrows and Volker are correct in their 
analyses, we can view Kramer as not simply 
suggesting the possible existence of secondary 
implied powers, but as an actual instance of their 
use. The implications of this interpretation of 
Kramer are very wide indeed. All sorts of 
circumstances can be contemplated in which a 
two-step process, leading to secondary implied 
powers, could push the boundries of the Community's 
treaty-making powers beyond the most liberal 
expectations. 
The key phrase quoted above, "the only way to 
ensure the conservation of the biological resources 
of the sea • " reveals the existence of 
necessity in this case and a critical difference 
between the reasoning here and in the ERTA decision 
r I 
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as well. In Kramer as in ERTA, regulations had 
already been passed by the Community before the 
·agreement was concluded. But instead of relying on 
ERTA's rule of automatic implied powers by examining 
the NEAFC agreement to see whether it "affected" the 
Community's internal measures, the Court made an 
individual examination of necessity in the Kramer 
case. 
In reality, the facts of Kramer presented the 
Court with a very serious dilemma. If it applied 
the rule of automatic implied treaty-making powers 
of ERTA, and thereby found that the NEAFC agreement 
did indeed affect Community regulations 2141/70 and 
2142/70, the result would have been an exclusive 
treaty-making power on the part of the Community 
based on the dual nature of the ERTA rules, which 
create both power and exclusivity. The option 
available in ERTA of allowing the Member States to 
act through a finding of "delegated" Community power 
did not exist in Kramer since the NEAFC agreement 
had already been concluded six years earlier, and no 
decision similar to the Council deliberation of 
March 20, 1970 in the ERTA case had taken place at 
that time. We can remember here that the Council 
deliberation of March 20, 1970 endorsed Member State 
action, and was interpreted by the Court in ERTA as 
r I & 
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a delegation of Community power. The Court's 
alternative under the automatic rule, of finding 
·that the NEAFC agreement did not affect the 
Community's internal measures, would have left the 
Member States treaty-making authority intact and not 
resulted in a finding of Community power. 
The Court in the final analysis, took a middle 
road which allowed it to conclude that an implied 
Community treaty-making power existed to conserve 
the biological resources of the sea, but which also 
made it possible to find that concurrent Member 
State power existed for a transitional period in the 
same area. We can speculate that if the agreement 
involved had not yet been concluded, the Court would 
have been more likely to find the Community's 
internal rules "affected" by the contemplated 
obligation, and thus condition any Member State 
action on the authorization or delegation of 
Community power. It would seem in the future as 
well, that where an agreement has not yet been 
concluded, the Court will be more favorably disposed 
to rely on ERTA's rules of automatic implied powers. 
It would certainly be incorrect to conclude 
that the Court through the Kramer decision either 
overruled or discredited the rule of automatic 
implied powers in ERTA. It is true that it did not 
'f 
I 
I 58 
rely on the concept for its finding of Community 
treaty-making power, but in essence the Court found 
·that one condition for application of the automatic 
rule--that the agreement in question "affect" or 
"potentially affect" the internal measure--was not 
fulfilled. This is suggested by recitals 35 through 
38 of the Kramer judgment, where the Court 
emphasized the limited nature of the provisions 
adopted by the Community. In recitals 40 and 41 one 
should note that the Court ruled the Member States' 
authority was transitional and would end when the 
Council adopted "measures for the conservation of 
the resources of the 11 sea • Thus, when common 
substantive measures were in place which could be 
affected by Member State agreements, the nature of 
the implied treaty-making power would shift from 
concurrent to exclusive. One could argue that the 
basis of those powers would change as well, from 
individual necessity to automatic implied power 
based on the ERTA rule. 
Generally speaking, we can conclude from Kramer 
that where internal measures exist, but will not be 
affected by an international agreement, the 
necessity for Community treaty-making powers may 
still be present and it will be possible to find 
them on an individual basis. An implied power 
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discovered through an individual finding of 
necessity, however, will not necessarily be 
exclusive. 
The Court revealed certain priorities in 
dealing with the competing values present in the 
Kramer case. In its resolution of the issues the 
Court attempted to balance the immediate need for 
tools to cope with the actual problems of sea 
resource conservation such as internal measures and 
international agreements, with a clear desire to 
further the process of progressive integration. 
This it did while trying to take into account 
economic, social and environmental aspects of the 
problems at hand. The most serious danger facing 
the Court was the clear consequence of deciding that 
Regulations 2141/70 and 2142/70 had been affected by 
the NEAFC agreement. The result would have been a 
finding that the Member States had lacked the power, 
six years earlier, to negotiate and conclude the 
addition to the 1959 fishing convention. Many hours 
of negotiations would have been made fruitless, a 
tangible solution for fishing problems would have 
been abandoned, and doubts would have been raised 
for third countries regarding the reliability of 
Member States as treaty partners. Most critically, 
the Member States would have been thrown into the 
4· 
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position of having to breach either European 
Community or international law. 
The Court's product in the Kramer case took 
account of the various needs involved in a flexible 
and pragmatic manner, by balancing the practical 
result of a finding of exclusive European Community 
power with the ideal of commonly created and 
enforced rules. It left the ERTA decision's rule of 
automatic treaty-making powers intact and made clear 
that either an effect on internal rules, or an 
individual finding of necessity would serve as 
equally valid foundations for finding implied 
powers. By avoiding the conclusion that the 
treaty-making power rested exclusively in the hands 
of the Member States at the time of the NEAFC 
agreement, and would shift to the Community at a 
future date, when substantive rules were introduced, 
the Court upheld a vision of implied powers as 
existing from the time of adoption of the Treaties, 
thereby reinforcing its role as an interpretor, 
rather than an amender of the treaties. The 
balancing of priorities by the Court mark this case 
as a pragmatic endorsement of the process of 
progressive integration. 
The Rhine Case: Opinion given pursuant to Article 
228(1) of the EEC Treaty, Opinion 
1/76 
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a. Facts 
The Commission, following the Article 228 
procedure, requested that the Court give an opinion 
as to whether the draft Agreement establishing a 
European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels 
was compatible with the provisions of the Treaty. 
The draft Agreement resulted from a series of 
negotiations between the Commissioner, Switzerland 
and six Member States, whose object was to eliminate 
disturbances arising from a surplus carrying 
capacity for goods by inland waterway. It was 
necessary to involve Switzerland in any plan to 
resolve the situation because Switzerland enjoyed a 
right of navigation on the waters concerned which 
had resulted from earlier international agreements 
concluded with certain Member States. 
The system created by the draft Agreement 
consisted of temporarily laying-up a part of the 
available carrying capacity in exchange for 
financial compensation to carriers who would agree 
to voluntarily withdraw their vessels from the 
market for limited periods. The framework for the 
system was to be the "European laying-up fund for 
inland waterway vessels" which was contemplated as 
an international public institution with legal 
---- ---------------
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personality. 
In its request for an opinion the Commission 
asked first about the legal basis for the Agreement 
and justification for the participation of 
particular Member States. Second, it asked whether 
the grant to fund organs of the power to make 
decisions having general effect and direct 
applicability in the Member States was compatible 
with the Treaty. Finally, it inquired about 
possible conflicts with the Treaty resulting from 
the organization and powers of the Fund Tribunal. 
b. Opinion 
The Court examined the object of the system 
created by the draft Agreement, and found it an 
important factor in the common transport policy. In 
fact, Article 75 supplied the necessary legal basis 
to establish the system concerned within the 
European Community. In this case, it was 
"impossible fully to attain the objective pursued by 
means of the establishment of common rules pursuant 
to Article 75 of the Treaty" due to the 
participation of Swiss vessels in navigation on the 
waterways in question. The Court found that even 
where the power of the Community to conclude such an 
agreement was not expressly laid down in the Treaty, 
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"the Community has authority to enter into the 
international commitments necessary for the 
attainment of that objective even in the absence of 
an express provision in that . " connex1on . 
This was held to be so particularly in cases where 
internal power had already been used to adopt 
measures within the common policies, but was not 
limited to that eventuality. Although internal 
measures were only adopted when an agreement was 
concluded and made enforceable, the power to bind 
the Community nevertheless would flow by implication 
from the provisions creating the internal power. 
c. Analysis 
In the Rhine case implied powers were 
approached from the point of view of an individual 
finding of necessity rather than an ERTA-style 
finding of automatic implied powers. This had to be 
so, for in the Rhine case common internal rules had 
not been adopted at the time the Agreement came 
under the Court's consideration, so the "effects 
test" of ERTA could not possibly come into play. 
The fact that internal rules did not exist when 
the conclusion was made that an implied Community 
treaty-making power existed made this case unique 
when it was decided. At the same time, some 
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precedent for allowing Community treaty-making prior 
to the finding of internal rules did exist, in 
Opinion 1/75· F. Burrows discusses the fact that 
under Opinion 1/75, "there did not have to be 
internal measures first, before the Community had 
the power to act externally under Article 113", in 
his article on "The Effects of the Main Cases of the 
Court of Justice in the Field of External 
Competences on the Conduct of Member States". 
Burrows notes that this principle was not confined 
to cases falling within Article 113, and concludes 
that "here then was a foretaste on important 
advances in ERTA doctrine • " Michael Hardy, in 
his commentary, "Opinion 1/76 of the Court of 
Justice", points out this similarity as well in 
arguing that the Court has shown consistency in its 
view of express and implied treaty-making power. 
That the Court was willing to find an implied 
treaty-making power in the Rhine case despite the 
lack of existing internal rules should be examined 
in light of the fact that the Court allowed the 
Member States to participate in the Agreement 
alongside the Community. Might it be that the Court 
was willing to find implied treaty-making powers, 
despite the nonexistence of internal rules, only 
because the Member States also participated in the 
5· 
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agreement? In this regard we should note the 
Court's statement in recital 7 of the Opinion. 
-There it concluded that the Member States were 
justified in participating because Article 3 of the 
Agreement required them to amend certain 
international accords which had been concluded prior 
to the existence of the European Economic 
Community. It went on to find that: 
"The participation of these States in the 
Agreement must be considered as being solely 
for this purpose and not as necessary for the 
attainment of other features of the 
system • except for the special 
undertaking mentioned above, the legal effects 
of the agreement with regard to the Member 
States result, in accordance with Article 
228(2) of the Treaty, exclusively from the 
conclusion of the latter by the Community". 
Based on this wording, it appears that had Article 3 
been excluded from the Agreement, the Court would 
still have found implied Community treaty-making 
power, despite the nonexistence of internal 
Community rules. Thus, it seems that the Court will 
be willing to imply Community treaty-making power in 
the absence of common internal rules, even without 
Member State participation in an agreement. 
The Euratom Case: Ruling delivered pursuant to 
the third paragraph of Article 
103 of the EAEC Treaty, Ruling 
178 
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a. Facts 
The draft Convention on the Physical Protection 
of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports was 
drawn up in 1977 under the aegis of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. The Convention 
required participating states to take appropriate 
measures to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, or 
damage of nuclear material, to arrange for 
cooperation and coordination between national 
agencies, and to make certain activities, like the 
theft or damage of nuclear material, a punishable 
offense under criminal law. A dispute developed as 
to whether the Community should participate in the 
agreement alongside the Member States. The dispute 
centered on Article 4, which required participating 
states not to import or export, or permit the import 
or export of, nuclear material unless that material 
was at all times during international transfer 
subject to the precautions laid down by the 
Convention. 
The case was brought under Article 103 of the 
European Atomic Energy Community Treaty, which sets 
out the following procedures: 
Article 103 
"Member States shall communicate to the 
Commission draft agreements or contracts with a 
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third State, an international organisation or a 
national of a third State to the extent that 
such agreements or contracts concern matters 
within the purview of this Treaty. 
If a draft agreement or contract contains 
clauses which impede the application of this 
Treaty, the Commission shall, within one month 
of receipt of such communication, make its 
comments known to the State concerned. 
The State shall not conclude the proposed 
agreement or contract until it has satisfied 
the objections of the Commission or complied 
with a ruling by the Court of Justice, 
adjudicating urgently upon an application from 
the State, on the compatibility of the proposed 
clauses with the provisions of this Treaty. An 
application may be made to the Court of Justice 
at any time after the State has received the 
comments of the Commission". 
As required by Article 103, the Belgian Government 
communicated the draft Convention to the Commission, 
which responded with a letter containing the same 
message that it earlier sent to Council: The Member 
States could not obligate themselves under Article 4 
(1) of the draft Convention without impeding the 
application of the EAEC Treaty. And further, since 
the Convention fell within the Community's powers, 
the only satisfactory solution was for the Member 
States to participate in the Convention alongside 
the Community. The Government of Belgium referred 
the matter to the Court in order to clarify the 
interpretation of the Treaty in regard to the 
Community's participation. 
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b. Decision 
The Court first reviewed Articles 101, 102, and 
103. Article 101 provides that: "The Community 
may, within the limits of its powers and 
jurisdiction, enter into obligations by concluding 
agreements or contracts with a third State, an 
international organisation or a national of a third 
State". Article 102 determines the procedure 
applicable to the conclusion of such obligations. 
The Court then reformulated the Belgian Government's 
questions, asking whether the participation of 
Member States in the Convention would conflict with 
the Treaty provisions relating to division of powers 
if the Community was not allowed to participate. It 
asked as well whether the Community had the 
necessary powers to ensure implementation of 
provisions to which it might subscribe. 
After reviewing the content of the draft 
Convention the Court concluded that it was 
"undeniable that the draft convention 'concerns' in 
various ways matters within the purview of the EAEC 
Treaty", thus meeting the requirement of Article 
103. It based this finding on a comparison of the 
draft Convention and the objects of the EAEC Treaty, 
and on the fact that the Convention and the Treaty 
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concerned the same materials and facilities. 
The Court then looked into whether the 
Community exercised "jurisdiction and powers" in the 
field of supply and the nuclear common market giving 
it the right to participate in the proposed 
convention. The Court found that the exercise of a 
number of Commission prerogatives in the field of 
nuclear material movement and supply would be 
affected by the obligations contained within the 
draft Convention. On this basis it concluded that: 
Recital 15 
" • it would not be possible for the 
Community to define a supply policy and to 
manage the nuclear common market properly if it 
could not also, as a party to the Convention, 
decide itself on the obligations to be entered 
into with regard to the physical protection of 
nuclear materials insofar as its 
functions • • were affected". 
Next the Court examined certain EAEC provisions 
which, it was proposed, invalidated the previously 
discussed considerations. First, under Article 195 
EAEC the Community institutions were bound to comply 
with conditions of access to ores, source materials 
and special fissile materials laid down in national 
rules and regulations made for public policy or 
public health reasons. The Court pointed out that 
Article 195 was not intended to settle questions of 
power in relations between the Community and the 
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Member States. Instead, the Court found, it 
required EC institutions to comply with Member State 
·requirements based on public health or public 
policy, and thus did not effect the Community's 
right or obligation to take measures guaranteeing 
security or its ability to enter international 
commitments for the same end. Second, the Court 
discussed Articles 62(2), 74 and 75, under which 
certain categories of nuclear materials were removed 
from the ambit of provisions relating to the supply 
system. The Court emphasized that the Treaty made 
provision for close supervision of material not 
falling within the monopoly of the Supply Agency. 
The Court concluded that these provisions left 
intact the principle of exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Community with regard to nuclear supplies and 
its general responsibility for the normal 
functioning of the nuclear common market. 
Consequently, it found: 
Recital 18 
" • if the Member States, without the 
participation of the Community, were to enter 
into obligations such as are contained in 
particular in Article 4 of the draft convention 
and if they wished to implement such 
obligations they would necessarily interfere 
with the scope of the jurisdiction of the 
Community and they would thus impede the 
application of the EAEC Treaty". 
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The Court next analyzed the safeguard 
provisions of the Treaty on the suggestion that 
these were aimed only at ensuring that nuclear 
materials were not diverted by the person possessing 
them, while the Convention served to avoid 
intervention by unauthorized third parties. It 
concluded that a restrictive interpretation of the 
safeguard provisions was unjustified, and that even 
if it was accepted, an area of conflict between the 
rules of the draft Convention and the EAEC Treaty 
would still exist. The exclusion of the Community 
from participating, it found, would hinder the 
functioning of the safeguards and compromise the 
subse~uent development of that system to its full 
scope: "From this aspect the power of the Community 
to participate in the proposed convention would also 
appear to be undeniable". 
Finally the Court examined the effects of the 
system of property ownership set up by the EAEC 
Treaty. The Court noted that the right of ownership 
of special fissile materials was granted to the 
Community while the right of use and consumption was 
reserved to the Member States. According to the 
Court, this system signified that no matter how 
nuclear materials were used, the Community would 
remain the exclusive holder of rights forming "the 
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essential content of the right of property", which 
was held to include the right to dispose of special 
·fissile materials. Because the right of ownership 
was concentrated in the Community, the Community 
alone was in a position to ensure that the needs of 
the public were safeguarded in its own field. Even 
the right of use under Article 87 was subject to an 
express reservation in regard to compliance with 
Treaty obligations, including safeguard provisions 
and rights of the Supply Agency. As a result, if a 
new requirement of general interest should appear, 
it would be primarily for the owner of the nuclear 
materials to meet it. The aim of the Treaty was "to 
place the Community in a strong position to enable 
it to accomplish fully its task of general 
interest". On this basis too, the Court found, the 
Community possessed "a well-founded title to 
participate in a convention whose object is to 
reinforce the physical protection of materials of 
which it is the owner • " 
In its concluding remarks on the division of 
jurisdiction and power the Court noted that though 
the Treaty concerned, in part, the jurisdiction of 
the Member States and, in part, that of the 
Community, "the centre of gravity of the draft 
convention • concerns matters within the 
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purview of the Treaty". To this the Court added a 
second observation, which it considered "more 
~pacifically legal in nature'', and "no less 
decisive". It found that: 
recital 32 
" • The system of physical protection 
organized by the draft convention could only 
function in an effective manner, within the 
ambit of Community law, on condition that the 
Community itself is obliged to comply with it 
in its activities. To the extent to which 
jurisdiction and powers have been conferred on 
the Community under the EAEC Treaty the Member 
States, whether acting individually or 
collectively, are no longer able to impose on 
the Community obligations which impose 
conditions on the exercise of prerogatives 
which thence forth belong to the Community and 
which therefore no longer fall within the field 
of national sovereignty. Therefore, to the 
extent to which the Community is to be bound to 
comply with the convention it is necessary that 
it should assume such obligations itself; that 
is the sense of Article 101, which states that 
it is 'the Community' which may enter into 
obligations by concluding agreements or 
contracts, and of Article 184 which confers 
legal personality upon it". 
c. Analysis 
The primary question with regard to the Euratom 
case is whether it is an implied powers case at 
all. Does the EAEC Treaty, unlike the EEC Treaty, 
grant the Community full treaty-making power with 
respect to all areas where the Community has 
internal power? In other words, is there an express 
grant of treaty-making power which sets up a system 
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of complete parallelism between internal and 
external powers? The clause which could arguably do 
so is Article 101. 
Article 101 
"The Community may, within the limits of 
its powers and jurisdiction, enter into 
obligations by concluding agreements or 
contracts with a third State, an international 
organisation or a national of a third State. 
Such agreements or contracts shall be 
negotiated by the Commission in accordance with 
the directives of the Council; they shall be 
concluded by the Commission with the approval 
of the Council; which shall act by a qualified 
majority •. 
Agreements or contracts whose 
implementation does not require action by the 
Council and can be effected within the limits 
of the relevant budget shall, however, be 
negotiated and concluded solely by the 
Commission; the Commission shall keep the 
Council informed". 
The critical issue is whether the first paragraph of 
this clause should be interpreted as meaning that 
where the Community has internal powers under the 
EAEC Treaty, it also has external powers. 
Alternatively, it could be read as confirming that 
where the EAEC Treaty expressly refers to 
international agreements, the Community can indeed 
make treaties. The wording of Article 101 itself 
arguably supports either assertion. Its ambiguity 
lies in the fact that the phrase "within the limits 
of its powers and jurisdiction ••• " leaves 
unanswered the question of what the Community's 
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powers and jurisdiction actually are. 
One can support the idea that this provision 
does not expressly create a situation of full 
parallelism by pointing out that the provision does 
not say, "The Community may, to the extent of its 
internal powers and jurisdiction, enter into 
obligations by concluding agreements or 
contracts • " On the other hand, one might 
counter, what would be the logic of including a 
separate treaty article simply to confirm that the 
Community can make international agreements wherever 
the EAEC Treaty says it can? One possibility would 
be that the Article functions to limit the 
Community's treaty-making powers to areas which have 
been expressly provided for by the EAEC Treaty. 
Arguing against this, however, is the general sense 
of Article 101, whose intent seems to have been to 
grant rather than limit Community action. This is 
revealed by the first three words: "The Community 
11 A second, and more plausible explanation may • 
is that Article 101 confirms the international legal 
personality of the EAEC. This is supported by the 
fact that under this interpretation Article 101 
would not simply duplicate Articles 184 and 185, as 
those do not specifically refer to personality at 
the international level. An examination of these 
articles will confirm that fact: 
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Article 184 
"The Community shall have legal personality". 
Article 185 
In each of the Member States, the Community 
shall enjoy the most extensive legal capacity 
accorded to legal persons under their laws; it 
may, in particular, acquire or dispose of 
movable and immovable property and may be a 
party to legal proceedings. To this end, the 
Community shall be represented by the 
Commission". 
We shall look now to legal commentators, the 
"analysis of the arguments submitted by the 
parties", and the ruling itself to investigate the 
scope of the Community's express treaty-making 
powers under the EAEC Treaty and consequently, 
whether the Euratom ruling should be analyzed as an 
express or implied powers case. 
Ami Barav adopts the view that the Euratom 
ruling involves a case of express treaty-making 
power in his article entitled, "The Division of 
External Relations Power Between the European 
Economic Community and the Member States in the 
Case-Law of the Court of Justice". There he writes, 
"The Court's case-law on express grant of external 
power reveals two approaches • • In this respect, 
the Court held in Ruling 1/78 •• " Catherine 
Flaesch-Mougin goes even farther than simply 
refering to Ruling 1/78 as an express powers case. 
She argues that Article 101 sets up an express 
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system of parallelism between internal and external 
powers, in "Jurisprudence: Cour dB Justice, 14 
Novembre 1978" (Cahiers de Droit Europeen 1981, p. 
70-142). After mentioning the EEC Treaty 
Flaesch-Mougin states that "contrairement a ce 
dernier, le traite CEEA consacre expressement 
l'existance d'une regle de parallelisme de 
competences internee et externes". 
In its argument submitted to the Court, the 
Commission referred to Article 101 when it 
emphasized that the draft Convention would restrict 
the transfer of nuclear materials in order to 
support its conclusion that the Community had the 
power to enter into the obligations contained in 
Article 4 of the draft Convention. When the 
Commission mentioned Article 101 EAEC, it did so as 
follows: 
"Under Article 101 of the Treaty the Commission 
is expressly given very wide external powers in 
particular with regard to supply and 
supervision. Thus in particular under the 
last paragraph of Article 52 and under Article 
53 and 61 of the Treaty it has the necessary 
powers to undertake, on an international level, 
that no transfers of special fissile materials 
contrary to the convention shall henceforth be 
made". 
The first sentence of this statement appears to 
relate not to the first paragraph of Article 101, 
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but to the second and third, which discuss the 
Commission's role within the Community. In other 
words, it seems that this statement was not meant to 
address the division of powers between the Community 
and the Member States, but rather the division of 
powers on a horizontal plane between the various 
Community institutions, since it refers to "the 
Commission" rather than "the Community". On the 
other hand, if one looks at this in the context of 
the preceding paragraph, the Commission appears to 
have been referring to division of powers on a 
vertical, rather than a horizontal plane since in 
that paragraph the power question is discussed in 
terms of "the Community" and "the Member States". 
This alternate view regarding the Commission's 
interpretation of Article 101 is supported by its 
use of the word "necessary". Had the Commission 
wanted to say that Article 101 expressly created 
full parallelism between internal and external 
Community powers, it could have left this word out 
and instead said, "it has the powers to 
undertake . 11 As it stands, the Commission's 
position appears to be that the Community has powers 
at an international level when "necessary", i.e., as 
a result of the doctrine of implied powers. 
However, perhaps "necessary" should be read 
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differently in this context. For the Commission's 
statement seems to use the word in the sense of 
"sufficient" powers, at the international level, 
rather than in the sense of powers '' ,, necessary for 
the effective exercise of express Community powers. 
One can conclude that the Commission's understanding 
of Article 101 is not absolutely clear from the 
context in which it is mentioned. The thing which 
is certain is that the Commission refrains from 
explicitly arguing that Article 101 creates full 
parallelism between internal and external powers. 
The Council does not mention Article 101 in its 
argument at all, which is understandable considering 
the ambiguous nature of the Article and its desire 
that the Community not participate in the Convention. 
Finally, we must look at the statements of the 
Court in regard to Article 101. In recital 2, after 
quoting Articles l and 2 the Court finds that: 
"Taken as a whole these provisions define the powers 
and jurisdiction of the Community in the field of 
external relations". But throughout a relatively 
long opinion, the Court never mentions Article 101 
again until the end of the opinion. In recital 32 
it concludes that: 
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"to the extent to which the Community is to be 
bound to comply with the convention it is 
necessary that it should assume such 
obligations itself; that is the sense of 
Article 101, which states that it is 'the 
Community' which may enter into obligations by 
concluding agreements or contracts, and of 
Article 184 which confers legal personality 
upon it". 
Its last mention of Article 101 occurs in recital 33 
where it finds that: 
"the exclusion of the Community from 
participation in the Convention would detri-
mentally affect the powers conferred upon it by 
the Treaty with regard to supply and the 
nuclear common market, the responsibilities 
borne by it with regard to security and the 
comprehensive nature of its right of 
ownership • • The Member States are not to 
intervene in the exercise of these 
prerogatives; in accordance with the division 
of powers set out in Article 101 of the Treaty 
that right is conferred upon the common 
institutions alone". 
On the one hand, the Court uses the phrase " . ~n 
accordance with the division of powers set out in 
Article 101" in recital 33· This is consistent with 
recital 2, where the Court concludes that Articles 
101 and 102 together "define the powers and 
jurisdiction of the Community". On the other, the 
Court nowhere comes forward and states that Article 
101 means that where the Community has internal 
power it consequently has external power. These 
recitals can be seen as cloaking the Court's own 
I 
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conclusions regarding the Community's powers under 
the EAEC Treaty. The Court implies that it is 
simply applying the words of Article 101, but it 
does not explain what is written there. The Court 
leaves unanswered the question of whether Article 
101 should be read as expressly creating complete 
parallelism between internal and external powers. 
If we assume that the ruling is not based on 
express powers flowing from Article 101, it is 
necessary to investigate whether the Court may have 
founded its ruling on individual grants of express 
treaty-making power which are present in the EAEC 
Treaty. In recital 33, quoted above, the Court 
notes that exclusion of the Community from 
participation in the convention would affect its 
powers with regard to supply and the nuclear common 
market, responsibilities relating to security, and 
the comprehensive nature of its right of ownership. 
Does the EAEC Treaty in fact supply grants of 
treaty-making power in all those areas? 
In the field of supply and the nuclear common 
market the Court notes that Article 52(b) refers to 
contracts relating to supply of materials coming 
from outside the Community. It notes as well that 
Article 64 mentions agreements or contracts between 
the Community and third States or international 
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organizations. After presenting other, similar 
provisions, the Court concludes that these reflect 
"the care taken in the Treaty to define in a precise 
and binding manner the exclusive right exercised by 
the Community in the field of nuclear supply in both 
internal and external relations". Although the 
Court uses the term "right" it appears to mean 
"power" in this context. Next the Court introduces, 
in a fashion similar to the cases previously 
discussed, the familiar doctrine of implied powers. 
The Court finds in recital 15 that: 
It thus appears that it would not be possible 
for the Community to define a supply policy and 
to manage the nuclear common market properly if 
it could not also, as a party to the 
Convention, decide itself on the obligations to 
be entered into with regard to the physical 
protection of nuclear materials in so far as 
its functions in the fields of supply and the 
nuclear market were affected". 
All the usual elements in the implied powers formula 
are present here. Express power exists, both 
internally and externally, to define a common supply 
policy and create a nuclear common market. The 
Court shows the existence of necessity, without 
actually using the word, by saying that "it would 
not be possible" to carry out these functions 
properly if the Community could not also decide on 
obligations "with the regard to the physical 
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protection of nuclear materials". Community power 
will exist to the extent that "functions" are 
affected. Thus it seems that actual use of express 
powers is not required. 
In the next section, beginning at recital 16, 
the Court discussed the general reservation made by 
Article 195 EAEC according to which the institutions 
of the Community were instructed to comply with 
conditions of access to nuclear materials set down 
in national rules and regulations for reasons of 
public policy or public health. The argument seems 
to have been that this provision supported not only 
internal rules but international agreements by 
Member States grounded in public policy or public 
health. The Court noted that the Article referred 
to requirements laid down by Member States in their 
natural territory. The Court was unwilling to give 
the provision a broader definition since it 
constituted a "reservation", and thus an exception 
to the general principles previously discussed. 
This should be seen, though it was not labeled as 
such, as an example of narrow interpretation based 
on a comparison of fundamental Treaty principles and 
an exception-creating provision. 
In the Court's discussion of safeguards, which 
followed, it outwardly contemplated a proposed 
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"restrictive interpretation". The suggestion was 
that the security provisions were meant as a check 
on possible diversion by the person rightfully in 
possession of nuclear materials to a purpose other 
than the one declared, rather than prevention of 
intervention by third parties. Thus the Court was 
faced with a choice between two conflicting 
interpretations of a Treaty provision, a situation 
ripe for resolution by either wide or narrow 
interpre- tation by the Treaty. The label which 
would be applied depended on which provision was 
more consonant with the Treaty as a whole. The 
Court examined the preamble in regard to Treaty 
objectives, Article 2(e) regarding Community tasks, 
and the term "safeguards" itself in order to 
determine how safeguards should be conceptualized. 
It concluded that the term was sufficiently 
comprehensive, within the meaning of the Treaty, to 
include measures of physical protection. 
The Court then contemplated what the result 
would be if it found that safeguards "as 
specifically laid down" in the Treaty did not 
encompass diversions by third persons. Here the 
Court relied on the doctrine of implied powers 
noting that the Commission had laid down regulations 
concerning the application of the safeguards 
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provisions, and that the Community had power to 
assume obligations in regard to third States which 
would need to be guaranteed. The exercise of these 
powers, it concluded, "would be hindered and its 
responsibility set at naught" if the Community was 
excluded from participation in the Convention. In 
addition, the subsequent development of the system 
"to its full scope implied by the very concept of 
'safeguards'" would be compromised. One should note 
the explicit use of the term "implied". 
The Court next addressed the question of 
Community participation from the point of view of 
ownership of the nuclear materials referred to by 
the Treaty. The Court noted that the Community was 
exclusive holder of the rights forming "the 
essential content of the right of property", 
including the right to dispose of special fissile 
materials. Because the right of ownership was 
concentrated in the Community, it alone was in a 
position to ensure that the general needs of the 
public were safeguarded in its own field. As a 
result, when a "new requirement" or "unforeseen 
situation" arose, it was the Community which held 
the power to deal with the situation. Consequently, 
the Community had "a well-founded title" to 
participate in the Convention. 
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Here there are similarities to implied powers 
reasoning in that the Court is stressing "new" or 
"unforeseen" circumstances not contemplated by the 
Treaty. The Court emphasizes the existence of what 
it apparently sees as a beneficial concern or 
objective, namely, "the general needs of the 
public". Unlike a typical finding of implied powers 
by the European Court of Justice, however, the Court 
does not examine necessity from the point of view of 
allowing EC action where essential to the adequate 
use of a power given by the Treaty. (Here we should 
note that the Court refers to "property right", but 
that can be seen as being composed of various 
powers.) Instead, the Court seems concerned with 
the idea that the Community alone is "in a position 
to ensure" that the general needs of the public are 
safeguarded in its field. As in recital 18 of ERTA, 
"in a position" in this context can be taken to mean 
"has the power". Thus the Court looks at an 
objective of the Convention (to fulfill the needs of 
public) and finds a necessity that the Community 
participate because it exclusively controls a field 
of application of the Agreement. If this does, 
indeed, consist of an example of use of the implied 
powers doctrine, this particular formula seems to 
represent a dramatic change from past. Necessity is 
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investigated by looking at the objectives of the 
contemplated agreement (instead of the objectives of 
the Treaty according to the "old" formula) and then 
asking whether the Community must participate 
because the Member States cannot alone fulfill the 
Agreement's obligations. 
If we turn to the third and final part of the 
Court's decision we find, interestingly enough, a 
similar power formulation, which the Court 
introduces as "specifically legal in nature''. 
According to the Court: 
Recital 32 
"The system of physical protection organized by 
the draft convention could only function in an 
effective manner, within the ambit of Community 
law, on condition that the Community itself is 
obliged to comply with it in its activities •• 
to the extent to which the Community is to be 
bound to comply with the convention it is 
necessary that it should assume such obligations 
itself; that is the sense of Article 101 • • " 
Here again, the Court examines the aim of the 
Convention and whether it can function effectively 
without Community participation, instead of looking 
at the aim of express treaty-making powers and 
whether those can function without implying the 
treaty-making power of the Community. One can 
consider whether a formula such as this, allowing 
treaty-making by the Community wherever the 
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Community must participate in order for a 
contemplated agreement to function effectively, 
might not be equivalent to full parallelism of 
internal and external powers. 
At this juncture, however, we must consider 
once more Ami Barav' s statement that this case, and 
recital 32 in particular, are examples of case law 
on the concept of "necessity" in the context of an 
express powers decision. There is the further 
problem of the Court's holding that the conclusion 
it comes to in recital 32 "is the sense of Article 
101". The dilemma of Article 101 frankly seems to 
be left unanswered by this case, and with it the 
question of whether the Court is introducing a new 
test for finding implied powers. 
On a final note, the Court brings up the 
relevance of Article 192 in Part Three of the 
ruling. Article 192 EAEC, like Article 5 EEC, 
imposes an obligation on the Member States that they 
"abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the 
attainment of the objectives of this Treaty". Here 
it is necessary to pause and think about a basic 
premise in this paper: that the Treaties could 
not, and the Court would not, create a system in 
which certain agreements could not be concluded by 
either the Community or by the Member States. This 
'I 
'I 
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idea forms the basis of the "mirror-image" analysis 
in ERTA. Could not, then, Article 192 EAEC and 
Article 5 EEC be seen as potential sources of 
implied treaty-making power for the EC? Clearly, 
the fact that Member States have a duty to abstain 
from jeopardizing measures, could not be taken to 
mean that the Community can take such measures. 
Only when a shift from the Member States to the 
Community as treaty-maker would "cure" the 
jeopardizing effects of an agreement, could the 
Community claim implied powers. In other words, 
where the Member States are obligated to abstain 
from making an international agreement because it 
would jeopardise the attainment of Treaty 
objectives, the Community would have the power to 
make the same agreement so long as when concluded by 
the Community itself, the Treaty's objectives would 
no longer be jeopardized. A treaty that would 
jeopardize the Community's objectives, no matter 
which government entity signed it, could not be 
concluded at all. This proposition, though 
admittedly far-reaching, would avoid the possibility 
of a legal vacuum in which nobody was competent to 
conclude agreements that, in fact, would work to aid 
the Community in meeting its objectives, or at least 
not interfere with them. A necessary consideration 
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in evaluating this possibility would be whether 
Article 5 EEC and Article 192 EAEC constitute mere 
statements of principle, or whether they are 
directly applicable. 
6. The Natural Rubber Opinion: Opinion of the Court 
given pursuant to the 
second sub-paragraph of 
Article 228(1) of the 
EEC Treaty, Opinion 1/78 
a. Facts 
The Commission sent a "Recommendation for a 
decision on the negotiation of an international 
agreement on natural rubber" to the Council on 
October 5, 1978. The agreement referred to had been 
the object of negotiations in which the Community 
had participated within the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) since 
January, 1977• In its recommendation for a 
decision, the Commission took the position that the 
Community alone was competent, under Article 113 of 
the Treaty, to participate in negotiation and 
conclusion of the agreement. Several Member State 
delegations in the Council, however, took the view 
that the Commission recommendation should be based 
on both Articles 113 and 116 of the Treaty and that 
both the Community and the Member States should 
participate. The negotiations proceeded on the 
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basis of the second formulation, and the Commission, 
pursuant to Article 228(1), asked the Court to give 
an opinion as to the extent of the Community's 
powers to negotiate and conclude the Natural Rubber 
Agreement. 
b. Opinion 
The Court concluded that the Community's right 
to participate in the agreement was not contested. 
Instead it determined that the disagreement was over 
whether the subject-matter of the agreement came 
entirely within the powers of the Community or 
whether it fell partially within the scope of the 
Member States' powers in a way that would justify 
the joint participation of the Community and the 
Member States. The court reviewed the functions of 
UNCTAD and examined the nature and objectives of the 
Nairobi Resolution, which created the framework for 
the Natural Rubber negotiations. After describing 
the nature of the agreement itself and resolving 
with the question of admissibility in favor of the 
Commission's request, the Court proceeded to discuss 
the subject-matter and objectives of the agreement 
in order to answer the competence question. The 
central issue raised, according to the Court in 
recital 37, was whether the rubber agreement came 
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"as a whole or at least in essentials within the 
sphere of the 'common commercial policy'". Both the 
Council and Commission agreed that the agreement was 
closely connected with commercial policy, but could 
not agree on whether Article 113 covered the 
subject-matter of the agreement entirely. 
The Court concluded that the Community was 
competent to conclude commodity agreements as well 
as traditional commercial agreements. In addition, 
it found that where "organization of the Community's 
economic links with non-member countries may have 
repercussions on certain sectors of economic 
policy • • as is precisely the case with the 
regulation of international trade in commodities, 
that consideration does not constitute a reason for 
excluding such objectives from the field of 
application of the rules relating to the common 
commercial policy". Finally the Court examined 
whether the arrangements for financing the buffer 
stock could negate the Community's exclusive 
competence in common commercial policy matters. It 
concluded that should the charges for maintaining 
the stock be borne directly by the Member States, 
that would "imply the participation of those States 
in the agreement together with the Community". 
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c. Analysis 
At first glance the Opinion of the Court in 
Natural Rubber seems unrelated to the doctrine of 
implied powers because the case involves the common 
commercial policy, where treaty-making power is 
expressly provided by the Treaty. It seems instead 
that the only task might be to define the content of 
the common commercial policy itself. However, the 
doctrine of implied powers comes into play in 
relation to this area too. Article 113 admits that 
its listing of various elements of the common 
commercial policy is incomplete, as a look at its 
first paragraph will show: 
Article 113 
1. "After the transitional period has ended, the 
common commercial policy shall be based on uniform 
principles, particularly in regard to changes in 
tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade 
agreements, the achievement of uniformity in 
measures of liberalization, export policy and 
measures to protect trade such as those to be taken 
in case of dumping or subsidies". 
Even if it did not include the words 
"particularly in regard to ••• " the possibility of 
using the doctrine of implied powers to broaden 
Article 113 would still have existed. It is thus 
important to examine the Natural Rubber opinion in 
order to ascertain whether the treaty-making power 
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of the Community has been expanded through reliance 
on the implied powers doctrine to broaden the 
boundaries of the express treaty-making power within 
the common commercial policy itself. 
The first step is to look for wording in the 
opinion which resembles the usual formula for 
finding implied powers. In recital 43 the Court 
points out that " • it is clear that a coherent 
commercial policy would no longer be practicable if 
the Community were not in a position to exercise its 
powers also in connection with a category of 
agreements which are becoming, alongside traditional 
commercial agreements, one of the major factors in 
the regulation of international trade". Similarly 
in recital 44, the Court finds that, "it would no 
longer be possible to carry on any worthwhile common 
commercial policy if the Community were not in a 
position to avail itself also of more elaborate 
means devised with a view to furthering the 
development of international trade". The words "it 
would no longer be possible" and "it would no longer 
be practicable" convey the idea that the power to 
conclude commodity agreements is necessary to 
successful implementation of the common commercial 
policy. Necessity, as we have seen, is a key 
element in the formula for finding implied powers. 
95 
The formula for implied powers includes two 
other elements as well: an express power on which 
the implied power is based, and an objective for 
which the express power was provided and which will 
not be attainable without the implication of 
unwritten powers. The objective in this case is the 
implementation of a "coherent" or "worthwhile" 
common commercial policy. The third element, that 
of express powers is slightly more difficult to 
locate. To say that the express power here is the 
power to implement the common commercial policy 
seems to get us nowhere, since it is that very 
policy which we are trying to define by identifying 
the individual powers which make it up. It is more 
useful to examine Article 113, which gives a partial 
listing of aspects of the common commercial policy, 
and specifically mentions "the conclusion of tariff 
and trade agreements". Article 114 then goes on to 
grant the power to conclude these agreements to the 
Council, acting "on behalf of the Community". From 
the existence of necessity, express power and 
related objectives, we can conclude that the Natural 
Rubber opinion contains elements in its reasoning 
which form the basis for a finding of implied 
powers, and which reveal the existence of a 
Community power to conclude international commodity 
agreements. 
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Side by side with the implied powers doctrine, 
however, strands of another sort of reasoning 
appear. The critical passage is recital 49 where 
the Court finds that: 
"having regard to the specific nature of the 
provisions relating to commercial policy in so 
far as they concern relations with non-member 
countries and are founded, according to Article 
113, on the concept of a common policy, their 
scope cannot be restricted in the light of more 
general provisions relating to economic policy 
and based on the idea of mere coordination". 
Thus the Court introduces elements of the method 
termed "wide" or "narrow" interpretation. This 
method is utilized by the European Court of Justice 
as well as various national and international 
courts, according to Professor F. Dumon in his 
article titled, "The Case-law of the Court of 
Justice--a critical examination of the methods of 
interpretation". (p. III-123) Dumon does not begin 
his discussion by defining wide and narrow 
interpretation, but instead quotes from Charles de 
Visscher, who has written on the subject in relation 
to international courts in "Problemes 
d'interpretation judiciaire en droit international 
public". According to de Visscher: 
"a strict interpretation is necessary if the 
provision in dispute derogates from the general 
law which is acknowledged to apply. .; if 
the provision • • derogates from the 'normal 
rule' in a certain field; if, when the court is 
faced with two provisions of equal authority, 
one of which appears to have a wider scope than 
the other, a strict interpretation reconciles 
the wording of the two provisions and to that 
extent accords with what was in all likelihood, 
the common intention of the parties; or if the 
clause to be applied deviates either from the 
underlying concept or from the general 
structure of the treaty". 
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From Charles de Visscher's examples it is possible 
to conclude that the method involves an element of 
cbmparison or conflict, where two "rules" or 
"concepts", as Dumon puts it, (p. III-123), must be 
reconciled. Thus, the aspect of being "wide" or 
"narrow" is always a relative question, taken in 
relation to a second rule or concept of law with 
which the first is being compared. The object seems 
to be to consistently uphold the "broader" or more 
"fundamental" legal principle. Whether a court will 
label its interpretation "wide" or "strict" is 
simply a function of which provision, the "more'' or 
"less" fundamental, the Court is trying to 
interpret. Thus it is assumed implicitly that 
different. provisions or concepts can be ranked in 
order of importance. This idea is encapsulated in a 
quotation set down by De Visscher: "Comme l'observe 
1. Soirat, '1' extension ou la restriction d'un 
texte douteux suppose deja l'existence d'une 
systematique qui assigne a la disposition contestee 
une place dans un ensemble donne'" (p. 92). 
One must analyze, however, whether the European 
Court of Justice is using the terms "wide" and 
"narrow" as they are described above. A brief 
examination of various cases may be helpful in this 
regard. A search of the Court's decisions shows 
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that "wide", "narrow", "broad", and "strict" 
interpretation have been mentioned in 157, 59, 56, 
and 102 cases respectively. Fortunately, Dumon 
provides a sampling of these decisions, and we shall 
work from the group he has selected. In Government 
of the Federal Republic of Germany v. Commission of 
the European Economic Community (Case 24/62 of July 
4, 1963 [1963] ECR 63), the Court of Justice held 
that Article 25 EEC had to be interpreted 
restrictively because it contained derogations from 
the common external tariff, a "foundation" of the 
Community. This clearly fits into de Visscher's 
fourth example of a clause that deviates from the 
underlying concept or general structure of a 
treaty. The element of comparison is present as 
between the article in ~uestion and the general 
concept of the Treaty. In Jean Ryners v. Belgian 
State (Case 2/74 of June 21, 1974 [1974] ECR 631) 
the Court faced the ~uestion of whether the terms of 
Article 55, which provides that the provisions of 
Chapter 2--Right of Establishment, of the EEC Treaty 
should apply "to activities ••• connected, even 
occasionally, with the exercise of public 
authority", covered a person who practiced the 
profession of advocate. The Court held that "having 
regard to the fundamental character of freedom of 
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establishment and the rule of equal treatment with 
nationals in the system of the Treaty, the 
exceptions allowed by the first paragraph of Article 
55 cannot be given a scope which would exceed the 
objective for which this exemption clause was 
inserted". Once again, the Court compared a clause 
creating an exception with more fundamental treaty 
principles. In Carmelo Angelo Bonsignore v. 
Oberstad-direktor der Stadt Koln (Case 67/74, 1975 
ECR 297), the Court's task was to interpret Council 
Directive No. 64/221 the object of which was to 
coordinate special measures concerning the movement 
and residence of foreign nationals on the basis of 
public policy, public security or public health. 
The Court concluded that the arti~le in question 
departed from the rules concerning the free movement 
of persons and that as exceptions they would have to 
be strictly construed. This falls in line with the 
pattern of comparison seen in other cases and 
corresponds to de Visscher's second example, of a 
provision which derogates from the "normal rule" in 
a certain field. 
We shall now look at cases involving wide inter-
pretation in order to see whether they too conform 
to the pattern. Of the numerous cases in which the 
Court relies on this method, we will look at two. 
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In Plaumann & Co. v. Commission of the European 
Economic Community (Case 25/62 of July 15, 1963 ECR 
95) the Court was called upon to interpret Article 
173 in order to determine whether the words "another 
person" in the provision that "any natural or legal 
person may • • institute proceedings against a 
decision ••• which, although in the form of • 
a decision addressed to another person, is of direct 
and individual concern to the former" referred to 
Member States or not. The Court found that: 
"this Article neither defines nor limits the 
scope of these words. The words and the 
natural meaning of this provision justify the 
broadest interpretation. Moreover, provisions 
of the Treaty regarding the right of interested 
parties to bring an action must not be 
interpreted restrictively. Therefore, the 
Treaty being silent on the point, a limitation 
in this respect may not be presumed". 
In his discussion of strict and wide interpretation 
Professor Dumon makes the statement that "lawyers of 
our background confer a strict interpretation on any 
provision which is capable of adversely affecting 
human liberty or dignity" (p. III-129). In 
complementary fashion the Court seems to find in the 
Plaumann case that important rights are at stake and 
therefore wide interpretation is required. One 
troubling issue presents itself. Most of the 
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examples we looked at in relation to strict 
interpretation contain a comparative element, but 
here only one provision is involved. In fact the 
aspect of comparison is still evident. Though one 
provision alone is involved the Court is asked to 
choose between two possible interpretations, 
consistently with de Visscher's fourth example. It 
chooses the one more consonant consistent with the 
important principle at stake, namely, access to 
justice. 
In Anita Cristini v. Societe nationale des 
chemins de fer francais (Case 32/75 of September 30, 
1975 (1975) ECR 1085), the plaintiff argued that the 
reduction card issued by the French national railway 
agency should have been issued to her although she 
was Italian and according to French law the cards 
could only be issued to French nationals. The basis 
for her argument was Article 7 of Council Regulation 
No. 1612/68 of October 15, 1968, which related to 
freedom of movement for workers in the Community. 
In trying to define the concept of social advantage 
under the regulation, the Court noted that certain 
Article 7 provisions referred to relationships 
deriving from contracts of employment, while others 
had nothing to do with such relationships and even 
assumed that the employment contract had been 
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terminated. The Court concluded under these 
circumstances that: 
"the reference to 'social advantages' in 
Article 7(2) cannot be interpreted 
restrictively. It therefore follows that, in 
view of the equality of treatment which the 
provision seeks to achieve, the substantive 
area of application must be delineated so as to 
include all social and tax advantages, whether 
or not attached to the contract of employment". 
This example reveals an element of comparison, as 
between different provisions in Article 7, as well 
as reliance on the fundamental principle of 
"equality of treatment" in deciding which of the two 
types of provisions should be given priority. 
Why then one may ask, looking back to the 
opinion in International Rubber, did the Court rely 
on both the implied powers doctrine and wide 
interpretation? Each method served a different 
purpose, as an examination of the opinion will 
reveal. The implied powers doctrine was used to 
show that although Article 113 expressly mentions 
only the conclusion of "tariff and trade 
agreements", new types of instruments not expressly 
mentioned would be interpreted as falling within the 
Community's authority as well. This was so in 
particular, according to the Court, because 
commodity agreements were becoming, "alongside 
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traditional commercial agreements, one of the major 
factors in the regulation of international trade". 
In other words, the Community was faced with the 
development of an important new form of agreement. 
Without the power to enter commodity agreements "it 
would no longer be possible to carry on any 
worthwhile common commercial policy". 
The function of the method of wide 
interpretation was different from the one described 
above. It served to answer the argument that the 
agreement had economic policy as well as common 
commercial policy aspects . The Court concluded that 
. though both aspects were present, the fact that an 
agreement might have repercussions on certain 
sectors of economic policy did "not constitute a 
reason for excluding such objectives from the field 
of application of the rules relating to the common 
commercial policy". In coming to this conclusion 
the Court examined the Treaty provisions dealing 
with the common commercial policy and economic 
policy, finding that the latter were "more general" 
and were "based on the idea of mere coordination" 
while the former were "specific" and concerned "the 
concept of a common policy". Thus it seems that the 
Court, in choosing between various possible 
characterizations of the agreement, chose the one 
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which better reinforced the more fundamental aspect 
of the European Community, the common commercial 
·policy. 
The conclusion which can be suggested here as 
to the difference between wide interpretation and 
the doctrine of implied powers is that the former is 
a method of choosing between conflicting aspects of 
law while the latter is a method of expanding powers 
which can be used, where appropriate, in conjunction 
with wide interpretation. Wide interpretation, it 
should be noted, is not always used to resolve power 
-questions. The two methods should not be viewed as 
identical, however, they can come together if the 
Court is faced, for example, with choosing between 
different interpretations of a Treaty provision, one 
of which is based upon a literal reading of a 
questioned passage, the other on an implied powers 
approach. If the Court concludes that the latter is 
more consistent with underlying Treaty principles it 
can opt for wide interpretation based on the implied 
powers doctrine. In a certain sense, every instance 
of reliance on the implied powers doctrine can be 
viewed as a choice between a literal reading and a 
non- literal approach. In that respect every 
finding of implied powers, it might seem, should be 
viewed as a case of wide interpretation by the 
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Court. But if a third possible interpretation can 
be imagined, even more extensive than the implied 
powers approach, the latter would be '' ,, . narrow ln 
comparison. The conclusion can only be that these 
terms have no meaning in and of themselves but 
instead are always relative, and dependent on the 
options at hand. 
7. Observations 
Parallelism is a term fre~uently used in 
relation to the theory of implied powers developed 
by the Court in the area of treaty-making. It 
refers to the concept that the Community's 
treaty-making powers are e~ual to its internal 
powers even where the former are not expressly 
granted by the Treaty. Judge Pescatore, a member of 
the Court of Justice, writes of the division of 
opinion among authors that existed prior to the ERTA 
decision in "External Relations in the Case-Law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities" 
(16 Common Market Law Review 1979, 615-645). 
According to Pescatore, some held the view that the 
Community's treaty-making powers were limited to the 
ones actually described in the Treaty, a theory 
based upon the principe d'attribution, whereas 
others felt that competence in external matters was 
106 
co-extensive with the Community's internal powers, 
the latter idea being expressed by the Latin maxim: 
{n foro interno, in foro externo. Can one conclude 
that the Court has adopted, through its decisions in 
the area of treaty-making, a model according to 
which the EC can conclude treaties in any area where 
it has internal power? 
From Pescatore's description of the ERTA 
judgment one might get the impression that the 
judgment created a system of parallelism between 
internal and external powers. He notes that one 
question remained open even after the decision, in 
that it was not clear whether a finding of implied 
power could only be made after internal rules were 
adopted. But to some extent he gives the impression 
that, at least in the area of common policies, 
parallelism of power does exist. In his description 
of that judgment he notes, "Considering that the 
Treaty provides for a common policy in the field of 
transport, the Community is vested with the power to 
enter into agreements with third countries relating 
to this subject matter, although the relevant 
articles of the Treaty do not expressly confer on 
the Community authority to this effect" (p. 619). 
Pescatore bases this conclusion on recital 19 of 
ERTA, under which " • the system of internal 
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Community measures may not therefore be separated 
from that of external measures". Pescatore wisely 
does not refer to any need for a finding of 
necessity, since the ERTA rules led to an 
"automatic" assumption that it exists. However he 
fails to note the requirement that an agreement 
"affect" internal rules, which is a condition for 
finding treaty-making power under ERTA. ERTA 
creates "parallelism" between internal and external 
powers only in cases where the conditions set out in 
its rules are fulfilled. When Pescatore discusses 
the question of necessity of internal measures 
raised in the ERTA judgment, in the context of 
Opinion 1/76 he states that the latter "puts an end 
to the uncertainty inherent in the ERTA judgment as 
to whether an external competence may be recognized 
also in cases where the Community, though having 
jurisdiction, has net yet covered the field by 
internal measures". The critical word here is 
" n may • Opinion 1/76 does not stand for the 
proposition that even in the absence of internal 
rules the existence of an internal power reveals the 
existence of an external power in the same area. 
Rather, it stands for the idea that the nonexistence 
of internal rules will not preclude a finding of 
implied treaty-making power so long as other 
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conditions are fulfilled. The key condition will be 
"necessity". On the basis of all that has been 
discussed so far, one is forced to question a 
comment put forward by Judge Pescatore in his 
"Contribution to the Discussion" at the Amsterdam 
Colloquium Communities and their Member States in 
the field of external relations" (1981). Pescatore 
quotes the phrase "in foro interne, in foro externa" 
after which he states: 
"This principle was enshrined by Article 6 of 
the ECSC Treaty; though this provision was 
forgone in the clauses of the EEC Treaty, it 
has been reconstrued by the Court's case-la~". 
In fact, from the above examination it seems that 
parallelism has not actually been instituted by the 
Court. 
We have seen that necessity is a key condition 
for finding that treaty-making powers can be implied 
from express grants of internal power. What exactly 
does necessity mean in the sense in which it is used 
by the Court? Professor Kovar, in "La contribution 
de la Cour de justice au developpment de la 
condition internationals de la Communaute 
europeenne" (1978 Cahiers de droit europeen P• 
527-573) writes that: 
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"il convient d'eviter toute confusion entre la 
preuve de la necessite d une action de la 
Communaute et l'evaluation de son opportunite. 
Ce sont deux appreciations distinctes par leur 
nature comme par leurs consequences. La 
premiere, comme en temoigne l'avis de la Cour 
est une operation essentiellement juridique 
puisque ressortit a l'interpretation du 
traite. La seconds implique des appreciations 
qui, pour l'essentiel, ne relevent pas du 
droit". 
Ami Barav, as well, has made valuable comments on 
this topic in the "General Discussion" at the first 
day of the Amsterdam Colloquium (Division of powers 
between the European Communities and their Member 
States in the field of external relations, P• 89). 
There he states as follows: 
"I disagree with Mr. Fischer's statement that 
the decision by the Community on the necessity 
of entering into international agreements, 
which is at the centre of Community power, is a 
political decision. The concept of necessity, 
as it emerges from the case law of the Court, 
is a truly legal one. The Court's case law 
establishes one point with respect to the 
appraisal of necessity: you must see whether 
exclusively internal legislation is enough to 
achieve a specific treaty objective, and, if it 
is not, whether the international agreement is 
suited for that purpose. This is a legal 
question. One would probably draw a 
distinction similar to the one made in French 
administrative law, between, on the one hand, 
the wisdom and the desirability, 
'l'opportunite' of an action, and, on the 
other, the legality and the necessity thereof. 
I do not think, therefore, that the concept of 
necessity, which is so important in determining 
not only the legal basis but also the scope of 
the Community's external power, is a purely 
political one". 
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The critical part of this quotation is the passage 
in which Ami Barav states that you must see whether 
exclusively internal legislation is enough to 
achieve a particular Treaty objective, and if not 
whether an international agreement will serve the 
same purpose: This tests can be termed an 
"impossibility test", with "impossibility" 
referring to the hopelessness of achieving 
Community objectives without the implication of 
implied powers. An examination of the cases we have 
looked at bears out Ami Barav's interpretation of 
necessity. 
Use of the term cannot be profitably assessed 
in ERTA because under the automatic rules the 
concept was not analyzed. Even in the supplementary 
individual finding of necessity in recitals 23 
through 28 the Court does not mention a specific 
standard to be applied. Instead in recital 27, the 
Court simply concludes that the powers of the 
Community "involve the need • • for agreements 
with the third countries concerned" without further 
explanation. Opinion 1/75 was based upon the 
express treaty-making power granted in Article 113 
and did not involve a finding of implied powers or 
an analysis of necessity. Necessity was looked at 
in recital 30/33 of the Kramer case, in which the 
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Court found an implied power on the part of the 
Community to conclude agreements for the 
conservation of sea resources. The Court first 
noted that on an internal level, the Community has 
power to conserve these resources. The Court next 
pointed out that "The only way to ensure the 
conservation of the biological resources of the sea 
both effectively and equitably is through a system 
of rules binding on all the States concerned • " 
We should note the idea of impossibility conveyed by 
"the only way". A particularly clear example of the 
Court's concept of necessity appears in recital 2 of 
the Rhine opinion. There, after discussing the 
express powers granted by the Treaty in transport, 
the Court found that, "In this case, however, it is 
impossible fully to attain the objective pursued by 
means of the establishment of common rules pursuant 
to Article 75 of the Treaty, because of the 
traditional participation of vessels from a third 
state, Switzerland • • It has thus been necessary 
to bring Switzerland into the scheme in question by 
means of an international agreement with this third 
State". Here the very word "impossible'' was used. 
Recital 15 of Euratom should be noted, despite the 
issue regarding whether the ruling should be seen as 
an implied or express powers case, as it contains 
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wording particularly consistent with the 
impossibility test. There the Court concluded that: 
"It thus appears that it would not be possible 
for the Community to define a supply policy and 
to manage the nuclear common market properly if 
it could not also, as a party to the 
Convention, decide itself on the obligations to 
be entered into with regard to the physical 
protection of nuclear materials in so far as to 
its functions in the fields of supply and the 
nuclear market were affected". 
Finally, in Natural Rubber the Court introduced the 
doctrine of implied powers in order to determine 
that the Community was capable of negotiating and 
concluding commodity agreements. The Court found in 
recital 43 that, "a c ohe rent c omme re ial policy would 
no longer be practicable if the Community were not 
in a position to exercise its powers also in 
connexion with a category of agreements which are 
becoming, alongside traditional commercial 
agreements, one of the major factors in the 
regulation of international trade". Once again the 
idea which is conveyed is one of impossibility. 
Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind 
that the Court may have taken a step towards 
introducing a new concept of necessity in relation 
to implied treaty-making power in the Euratom case. 
One should note once again the Court's approach in 
recital 32 of that case, where it examined the draft 
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Convention and found that it could only function in 
an effective manner on condition that the Community 
itself was obliged to comply with it in its 
activities. The Court concluded that to the extent 
to which the Community was bound to comply with the 
convention it was necessary that it assume such 
obligations itself. In the Natural Rubber opinion, 
which was handed down after the Euratom case, the 
Court relied on similar reasoning to find that the 
Member States should participate in the Natural 
Rubber Agreement. It again looked at the objectives 
and purposes of the agreement envisaged, and in 
recital 60 found the Member States would have to 
participate if they were to be responsible for 
implementing the financing provisions. Introduction 
of the idea that Member States or the Community 
should participate in an Agreement if implementation 
requires action or c~mpliance on their part would 
explain the seemingly inconsistent judgments 
regarding the effects of Member State financing of 
an Agreement in Opinion 1/75 and the Natural Rubber 
opinion. These judgments could be seen as resulting 
from a shift in the standard applied by the Court. 
An interesting comment by Judge Pescatore 
follows the same type of reasoning and can be 
compared with the above examples. In his 
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"Contribution to the Discussion" at the Amsterdam 
Convention (supra), Pescatore observed that behind 
the Court's reasoning in ERTA two arguments were 
paramount. According to Judge Pescatore the first 
of these was that "As a consequence of the internal 
transfer of power, the Community alone is enabled to 
implement the commitments which are to be entered 
into". It almost appears as if Pescatore was 
reading this argument into the case after the fact 
in an effort to pave the way for a new type of 
interpretation in the treaty-making area. The 
consistency between Judge Pescatore's comment and 
recital 32 in Euratom is so clear that it cannot 
help but to support the idea the latter may indeed 
represent a new trend in the Court's definition of 
necessity. Our next step shall be to examine the 
concept of necessity in the decision-making of the 
United States Supreme Court in order to determine 
whether it is indeed identical to the European Court 
of Justice's conception, and thus whether Advocate-
General Dutheillet de Lamothe's warning in ERTA that 
the Court risked introducing implied powers doctrine 
of the United States Supreme Court into European 
Community law was well founded. 
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III. The United States Supreme Court 
It is not possible to make a direct comparison 
between US and EC law because in the United States 
the power to make treaties is granted in full to the 
federal government by Article II, section 2 of the 
Constitution. Thus there has been no need to apply 
the doctrine of implied powers to questions of 
treaty- making in regard to division of power 
between the U.S. Government and the fifty States. 
The implied powers doctrine has been relied upon 
heavily, however, in relation to other sorts of 
power questions. The leading case in the area in 
U.S. constitutional law is undoubtedly McCullogh v. 
The State of Maryland. 
1. McCullogh v. The State of Maryland 4 Wheat. 316, 4 
L. Ed. 579 (1819). 
a. Facts 
The leading American case on the doctrine of 
implied powers, McCullogh v. The State of Maryland 4 
Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579(1819), arose following the 
Maryland legislature's adoption of an act imposing a 
tax on all banks or bank branches in the state not 
chartered by the Legislature. An action for penalty 
provided by the statute was brought by John James, 
suing for himself and the State, against James 
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McCullogh, cashier of the Baltimore branch of the 
Bank of the United States. The case was decided 
against McCullogh by the Maryland Court of Appeals. 
By writ of error it was taken to the Supreme Court. 
b. Decision 
Chief Justice Marshall observed that the state 
of Maryland denied the obligation of a law passed by 
the legislature of the Union and that McCullogh 
contested the validity of an act which had been 
passed by the Maryland legislature. Involved in 
these claims, Marshall concluded, was the United 
States Constitution, "in its most interesting and 
vital parts • • the conflicting powers of the 
government of the Union and of its members". First 
it had to be asked whether the Congress had power to 
incorporate a bank, and if so, whether the state of 
Maryland could tax a branch of that bank without 
violating the Constitution. 
Marshall concluded that the United States 
government was one of enumerated powers. It could 
exercise only those powers which had been granted to 
it. The power to establish a bank was not among the 
enumerated powers, but Marshall pointed out that the 
Constitution did not contain a clause requiring all 
grants of power to be express. A constitution was 
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not a legal code, and to re~uire "an accurate detail 
of the subdivisions of which its great powers will 
admit • • could scarcely be embraced by the human 
mind". A constitution should be marked out only in 
outline, while the minor ingredients which composed 
important objects would "be deduced from the nature 
of the objects themselves". 
Marshall noted that although the word "bank" or 
"corporation" did not appear among the enumerated 
grants in the Constitution, the powers to collect 
taxes, borrow money, regulate commerce, declare and 
conduct war, and raise and support armies were all 
expressly provided to the federal government. The 
government, Marshall found, must be allowed to 
select its means whenever it was under a duty or, 
alternatively, enjoyed a right to act. Anyone 
objecting to a "particular mode of effecting the 
object" took on the burden of establishing that 
exception. Marshall proceeded to examine the 
arguments against the constitutionality of the Bank, 
in the end concluding that the power to incorporate 
belonged to the federal government and that 
Maryland's imposition of a bank tax was 
unconstitutional. 
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c. Analysis 
The critical element of Chief Justice 
Marshall's opinion appears in his discussion of the 
federal government's power to charter a bank. He 
admits that important expressly enumerated powers do 
not auto- matically draw after them powers "of 
inferior importance" simply because they are 
inferior. But he asks whether that construction 
should "be preferred which would 
render • • operations difficult, hazardous, and 
. " expenslve • "Can we adopt" he inquires, "that 
construction • • which would impute to the 
framers • • the intention of impeding" the 
exercise of express powers "by withholding a choice 
of means?" Thus the Chief Justice takes into 
account factors such as difficulty and expense, 
while emphasizing the idea of a "choice of means" 
for the government. 
Marshall goes on to discuss the term 
"necessary" from the necessary and proper clause of 
Article I section 8 of the Constitution, asking 
about the sense in which the word necessary is used: 
"Does it always import an absolute physical 
necessity, so strong that one thing, to which 
another may be termed necessary, cannot exist 
without that other? We think it does not . 
To employ the means necessary to an end, is 
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generally understood as employing any means 
calculated to produce the end, and not as being 
confined to those single means, without which 
the end would be entirely unattainable". 
After noting that "This provision is made in a 
constitution intended to endure for ages to come, 
and, consequently, to be adapted to the various 
crises of human affairs" he writes: 
"To have declared that the best means shall not 
be used, but those alone without which the 
power given would be nugatory, would have been 
to deprive the legislature of the capacity to 
avail itself of experience, to exercise its 
reason, and to accommodate its legislation to 
circumstances". 
Finally, he concludes: 
"We admit, as all must admit, that the powers 
of the government are not to be transcended. 
But we think the sound construction of the 
constitution must allow to the national 
legislature that discretion, with respect to 
the means by which the powers it confers are to 
be carried into execution, which will enable 
that body to perform the high duties assigned 
to it, in the manner most beneficial to the 
people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be 
within the scope of the constitution, and all 
means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, 
but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional"· 
The fact that Marshall prefers to rely on the 
word "means" instead of "powers" should not be 
understood as representing a distinction in his mind 
between the two terms. It is clear that he sees the 
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ability of the federal government to incorporate a 
bank as a "power" from the following passage: 
"The power of creating a corporation is never 
used for its own sake, but for the purpose of 
effecting something else. No sufficient reason 
is, therefore, perceived, why it may not pass 
as incidental to those powers which are 
expressly given • 11 
The conclusion one can take from the passages 
set out above is that for the Court in McCullogh the 
concept of necessity is not absolute. The fact that 
options for achieving a particular goal already 
exist does not rule out the possibility of relying 
on implied powers to provide alternative means of 
potentially greater benefit. Legislative choice is 
emphasized by this approach. 
IV. Conclusion 
A comparison of European Court of Justice and 
United States Supreme Court decisions reveals a major 
difference in the concept of necessity. In the European 
Community an impossibility test is applied, meaning that 
powers will be implied only if there is no other way of 
using an express power to reach the objective for which 
it was granted. In the United States, however, Chief 
Justice Marshall flatly rejected a similar approach. 
Prior to that decision, the issues had been refined in 
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an on-going debate between then Secretary of State 
Thomas Jefferson and then Secretary of the Treasury 
Alexander Hamilton over the constitutionality of the 
bill creating the first Bank of the United States, 
the same issue which the court was to rule on in 
McCullogh v. Maryland. In Jefferson's view, 
"necessity" referred only to those powers without 
which explicit grants of power would be nugatory. 
Hamilton opposed this approach, arguing that "[t]he 
only question must be • • whether the means to be 
employed • • has a natural relation to any of the 
acknowledged objects or lawful ends of the 
government". Laurence Tribe, in "American 
Constitutional Law" (The Foundation Press, 1978) 
describes the Jefferson-Hamilton dispute as a 
disagreement over "whether 'necessary' meant 
'absolutely or indispensibly necessary', or meant 
only that the means must be 'needful, incidental, 
useful, or conducive to' an expressly delegated end 
of power". As we have seen, Marshall adopted 
Hamilton's view. 
An examination of International Court of 
Justice decisions based on implied powers reveals a 
conception of necessity much closer to the Court of 
Justice's view than the United States Supreme 
Court's rulings. In Reparation for Injuries 
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Suffered in the Service of the United Nations 
(I.C.J. Rep. 1949, p. 174) the Court examined the 
Competence of the United Nations to bring a claim 
against a State to obtain reparation for damage 
caused by the injury of a U.N. agent in the course 
of performing his duties. The International Court 
of Justice found as follows: 
"Whereas a State possesses the totality of 
international rights and duties recognized by 
international law, the rights and duties of an 
entity such as the Organization must depend 
upon its purposes and functions as specified or 
implied in its constituent documents and 
developed in practice. The functions of the 
Organization are of such a character that they 
could not be effectively discharged if they 
involved the concurrent action, on the 
international plane, of fifty-eight or more 
Foreign Offices, and the Court concludes that 
the Members have endowed the Organization with 
capacity to bring international claims when 
necessitated by the discharge of its functions". 
The Court based the finding of necessity in the 
above example on the idea that the United Nations 
"functions" could not be effectively discharged 
without an implication of nonexpress powers. 
The Permanent Court of International Justice, 
in Advisory Opinion No. 13 (p.c.r.J. Rep., Series B, 
12-18) was asked to inquire into the competence of 
the International Labour Organization to draw up and 
propose labour legislation to protect certain 
classes of workers which also incidently regulated 
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the same work when performed by the employer 
herself. The Court came to the following 
conclusions: 
"It results from the consideration of the 
provisions of the Treaty that the High 
Contracting Parties clearly intended to give to 
the International Labour Organization a very 
broad power of co-operation with them in 
respect of measures to be taken in order to 
assure humane conditions of labour and the 
protection of workers. It is not conceivable 
that they intended to prevent the Organization 
from drawing up and proposing measures 
essential to the accomplishment of that end. 
The Organization, however would be so prevented 
if it were incompetent to propose for the 
protection of wage-earners a regulative measure 
to the efficacious working of which it was 
found to be essential to include to some extent 
work done by employers". 
This holding is reminiscent of the European Court of 
Justice's ruling in the Kramer case in that there it 
was impossible to regulate fishing in the 
territorial seas of the Member States without 
regulating fishing on the high seas as well. The 
International Labour Organization's competence was 
based upon the fact that it was essential to the 
efficacious working of an express power to adopt 
regulations, a standard which falls in line with the 
previous case. 
The fact that the interpretation of the 
"necessity'' requirement by the European Court of 
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Justice is consistent with the International Court 
of Justice, and the Permanent International Court of 
Justice rather than the United States Supreme Court, 
cannot help but make one ~uestion the outpouring of 
excited reactions following the ERTA judgment. The 
decision appears rather less revolutionary than 
previously thought, and Advocate-General Dutheillet 
de Lamothe's dire warnings concerning the 
introduction of "American-style" implied powers seem 
somewhat unconvincing. Nonetheless, the unexpected 
nature of the European Court of Justice's decision 
should not be ignored, for in certain respects it 
faced greater obstacles in its finding of implied 
powers than did the United States Supreme Court. 
First, there was the factor of Article 235 EEC, in 
that the Treaty already contained a provision taking 
into account the need for action in certain areas 
where the powers granted by the Treaty were not 
sufficiently broad. Second was the fact that the 
EEC Treaty, unlike the United States Constitution, 
contained no express provision supporting a finding 
of implied powers. It is true that Marshall in 
McCullogh v. Maryland specifically made the point 
that even in the absence of the "necessary and 
proper" clause his finding would have remained the 
same. Still, that remark was only one of 
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speculation, while in the European Community the 
situation was one of fact. Though the conventional 
teaching regarding the introduction of implied 
powers reasoning in the treaty-making area should 
probably be tempered, the contribution of the 
European Court of Justice remains a profound example 
of the integrative capacity of the Court. 
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